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Abstract
We consider Bandits with Knapsacks (henceforth, BwK), a general model for multi-armed bandits
under supply/budget constraints. In particular, a bandit algorithm needs to solve a well-known knapsack
problem: find an optimal packing of items into a limited-size knapsack. The BwK problem is a common
generalization of numerous motivating examples, which range from dynamic pricing to repeated auctions
to dynamic ad allocation to network routing and scheduling. While the prior work on BwK focused on the
stochastic version, we pioneer the other extreme in which the outcomes can be chosen adversarially. This
is a considerably harder problem, compared to both the stochastic version and the “classic” adversarial
bandits, in that regret minimization is no longer feasible. Instead, the objective is to minimize the
competitive ratio: the ratio of the benchmark reward to algorithm’s reward.
We design an algorithm with competitive ratio O(log T ) relative to the best fixed distribution over
actions, where T is the time horizon; we also prove a matching lower bound. The key conceptual
contribution is a new perspective on the stochastic version of the problem. We suggest a new algorithm
for the stochastic version, which builds on the framework of regret minimization in repeated games and
admits a substantially simpler analysis compared to prior work. We then analyze this algorithm for the
adversarial version, and use it as a subroutine to solve the latter.
Our algorithm is the first “black-box reduction” from bandits to BwK: it takes an arbitrary bandit
algorithm and uses it as a subroutine. We use this reduction to derive several extensions.
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1 Introduction
Multi-armed bandits is a simple abstraction for the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation, i.e., be-
tween making potentially suboptimal decisions for the sake of acquiring new information and using this
information for making better decisions. Studied over many decades, multi-armed bandits is a very active
research area spanning computer science, operations research, and economics (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi,
2006; Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki, 2006; Gittins et al., 2011; Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012; Slivkins, 2019;
Lattimore and Szepesva´ri, 2019).
In this paper, we focus on bandit problems which feature supply or budget constraints, as is the case in
many realistic applications. For example, a seller who experiments with prices may have a limited inven-
tory, and a website optimizing ad placement may be constrained by the advertisers’ budgets. This general
problem is called Bandits with Knapsacks (BwK) since, in this model, a bandit algorithm needs effectively
to solve a knapsack problem (find an optimal packing of items into a limited-size knapsack) or generaliza-
tion thereof. The BwK model was introduced in Badanidiyuru et al. (2018) as a common generalization
of numerous motivating examples, ranging from dynamic pricing to ad allocation to repeated auctions to
network routing/scheduling. Various special cases with budget/supply constraints were studied previously,
(e.g., Besbes and Zeevi, 2009; Babaioff et al., 2015; Badanidiyuru et al., 2012; Singla and Krause, 2013;
Combes et al., 2015).
In BwK, the algorithm is endowed with d ≥ 1 limited resources that are consumed by the algorithm. In
each round, the algorithm chooses an action (arm) from a fixed set of K actions, and the outcome consists
of a reward and consumption of each resource; all are assumed to lie in [0, 1]. The algorithm observes bandit
feedback, i.e., only the outcome of the chosen arm. The algorithm stops at time horizon T , or when the total
consumption of some resource exceeds its budget. The goal is to maximize the total reward, denoted REW.
For a concrete example, consider dynamic pricing.1 The algorithm is a seller with limited supply of
some product. In each round, a new customer arrives, the algorithm chooses a price, and the customer either
buys one item at this price or leaves. A sale at price p implies reward of p and consumption of 1. This
example easily extends to d > 1 products/resources. Now in each round the algorithm chooses the per-unit
price for each resource, and the customer decides how much of each resource to buy at this price.
Prior work on BwK focused on the stochastic version of the problem, called Stochastic BwK, where the
outcome of each action is drawn from a fixed distribution. This problem has been solved optimally using
three different techniques (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018; Agrawal and Devanur, 2014), and extended in various
directions in subsequent work (Agrawal and Devanur, 2014; Badanidiyuru et al., 2014; Agrawal et al., 2016;
Agrawal and Devanur, 2016).
We go beyond the stochastic version, and instead study the most “pessimistic”, adversarial version where
the rewards and resource consumptions can be arbitrary. We call it adversarial bandits with knapsacks
(Adversarial BwK), as it extends the classic model of “adversarial bandits” (Auer et al., 2002). Bandits
aside, this problem subsumes online packing problems (Mehta, 2013; Buchbinder and Naor, 2009b), where
algorithm observes full feedback (the outcomes of all possible actions) in each round, and observes it before
choosing an action.
Hardness of the problem. Adversarial BwK is a much harder problem compared to Stochastic BwK. The
new challenge is that the algorithm needs to decide how much budget to save for the future, without being
able to predict it. (It is also the essential challenge in online packing problems, and it drives our lower
bounds.) This challenge compounds the ones already present in Stochastic BwK: that exploitation may be
severely limited by the resource consumption during exploration, that optimal per-round reward no longer
1See Section 8 in Badanidiyuru et al. (2018) for a detailed discussion of this and many other examples.
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guarantees optimal total reward, and that the best fixed distribution over arms may perform much better than
the best fixed arm. Jointly, these challenges amount to the following. An algorithm for Adversarial BwK
must compete, during any given time segment [1, τ ], with a distribution over arms that maximizes the total
reward on this time segment. However, this distribution may behave very differently, in terms of expected
per-round outcomes, compared to the optimal distribution for some other time segment [1, τ ′].
In more concrete terms, let OPTFD be the total expected reward of the best fixed distribution over arms.
In Stochastic BwK (as well as in adversarial bandits) an algorithm can achieve sublinear regret: OPTFD −
E[REW] = o(T ).2 In contrast, in Adversarial BwK regret minimization is no longer possible, and we
therefore are primarily interested in the competitive ratio OPTFD/E[REW].
It is instructive to consider a simple example in which the competitive ratio is at least 54 − o(1) for
any algorithm. There are two arms and one resource with budget T2 . Arm 1 has zero rewards and zero
consumption. Arm 2 has consumption 1 in each round, and offers reward 12 in each round of the first half-
time (T2 rounds). In the second half-time, it offers either reward 1 in all rounds, or reward 0 in all rounds.
Thus, there are two problem instances that coincide for the first half-time and differ in the second half-time.
The algorithm needs to choose how much budget to invest in the first half-time, without knowing what
comes in the second. Any choice leads to competitive ratio at least 54 on one of the problem instances.
Extending this idea, we prove an even stronger lower bound on the competitive ratio:
OPTFD/E[REW] ≥ Ω(log T ). (1.1)
Like the simple example above, the lower-bounding construction involves only two arms and only one
resource, and forces the algorithm to make a huge commitment without knowing the future.
Algorithmic contributions. Our main result is an algorithm which nearly matches (1.1), achieving
E[REW] ≥ 1O(log T ) (OPTFD − o(OPTFD)) . (1.2)
We put forward a new algorithm for BwK, called LagrangeBwK, that unifies the stochastic and ad-
versarial versions. It has a natural game-theoretic interpretation for Stochastic BwK, and admits a simpler
analysis compared to the prior work. For Adversarial BwK, we use LagrangeBwK as a subroutine, though
with a different parameter and a different analysis, to derive two algorithms: a simple one that achieves (1.2),
and a more involved one that achieves the same competitive ratio with high probability. Absent resource
consumption, we recover the optimal O˜(
√
KT ) regret for adversarial bandits.
LagrangeBwK is based on a new perspective on Stochastic BwK. We reframe a standard linear re-
laxation for Stochastic BwK in a way that gives rise to a repeated zero-sum game, where the two players
choose among arms and resources, respectively, and the payoffs are given by the Lagrange function of the
linear relaxation. Our algorithm consists of two online learning algorithms playing this repeated game. We
analyze LagrangeBwK for Stochastic BwK, building on the tools from regret minimization in stochastic
games, and achieve a near-optimal regret bound when the optimal value and the budgets are Ω(T ).3
We obtain several extensions, where we derive improved performance guarantees for some scenarios.
These extensions showcase the modularity of LagrangeBwK, in the sense that the two players can be
implemented as arbitrary algorithms for adversarial online learning that admit a given regret bound. Each
extension follows from the main results, with a different choice of the players’ algorithms.
2More specifically, one can achieve regret O˜(
√
KT ) for adversarial bandits (Auer et al., 2002), as well as for Stochastic BwK
if all budgets are Ω(T ) (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018). One can achieve sublinear regret for Stochastic BwK if all budgets are Ω(Tα),
α ∈ (0, 1) (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018).
3This regime is of primary importance in prior work (e.g., Besbes and Zeevi, 2009; Wang et al., 2014).
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Discussion. LagrangeBwK has numerous favorable properties. As just discussed, it is simple, unifying,
modular, and yields strong performance guarantees in multiple settings. It is the first “black-box reduction”
from bandits to BwK: we take a bandit algorithm and use it as a subroutine for BwK. This is a very natural
algorithm for the stochastic version once the single-shot game is set up; indeed, it is immediate from prior
work that the repeated game converges to the optimal distribution over arms. Its regret analysis for Stochastic
BwK is extremely clean. Compared to prior work (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018; Agrawal and Devanur, 2014),
we side-step the intricate analysis of sensitivity of the linear program to non-uniform stochastic deviations
that arise from adaptive exploration.
LagrangeBwK has a primal-dual interpretation, as arms and resources correspond respectively to pri-
mal and dual variables in the linear relaxation. Two players in the repeated game can be seen as the
respective primal algorithm and dual algorithm. Compared to the rich literature on primal-dual algo-
rithms (Williamson and Shmoys, 2011; Buchbinder and Naor, 2009b; Mehta, 2013) (including the more
recent literature on stochastic online packing problems Devanur and Hayes, 2009; Agrawal et al., 2014;
Devanur et al., 2011; Feldman et al., 2010; Molinaro and Ravi, 2012) LagrangeBwK has a very specific
and modular structure dictated by the repeated game.
Logarithmic competitive ratios are fairly common and well-accepted in the area of approximation algo-
rithms, and particularly in online algorithms (see Related Work for citations).
Benchmarks. We argue that the best fixed distribution over arms is an appropriate benchmark for Adver-
sarial BwK. First, consider the total expected reward of the best dynamic policy, denote it OPTDP. (The best
dynamic policy is the best algorithm, in hindsight, that is allowed to switch arms arbitrarily across time-
steps.) This is the strongest possible benchmark, but it is too strong for Adversarial BwK. Indeed, we show
a simple example with just one resource (with budget B), where competitive ratio against this benchmark
is at least T
B2
for any algorithm. Second, consider the total expected reward of the best fixed arm, denote it
OPTFA. It is a traditional benchmark in multi-armed bandits, but is uninteresting for Adversarial BwK. We
show that the competitive ratio is at least Ω(K) in the worst case, and this is matched, in expectation and up
to a constant factor, by a trivial algorithm that samples one arm at random and sticks with it forever.
For Stochastic BwK, these three benchmarks are related as follows. The best fixed distribution is still
the main object of interest in the analysis. However, all results – both ours and prior work – are almost
automatically extended to compete against the best dynamic policy. The best fixed arm is a much weaker
benchmark than the best fixed distribution: there are simple examples when their expected reward differs by
a factor of two, in multiple special cases of interest (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018).
2 Related work
The literature on regret-minimizing online learning is vast; see Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006); Bubeck
and Cesa-Bianchi (2012); Hazan (2015) for background. Most relevant are two algorithms for adversarial
rewards/costs: Hedge for full feedback (Freund and Schapire, 1999), and EXP3 for bandit feedback (Auer
et al., 2002); both are based on the weighted majority algorithm from (Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994).
Stochastic BwK was introduced and optimally solved in Badanidiyuru et al. (2018). Subsequent work
extended these results to soft supply/budget constraints (Agrawal and Devanur, 2014), a more general notion
of rewards4 (Agrawal and Devanur, 2014), combinatorial semi-bandits (Sankararaman and Slivkins, 2018),
and contextual bandits (Badanidiyuru et al., 2014; Agrawal et al., 2016; Agrawal and Devanur, 2016). Sev-
eral special cases with budget/supply constraints were studied previously: dynamic pricing (Besbes and
4The total reward is determined by the time-averaged outcome vector, but can be an arbitrary Lischitz-concave function thereof.
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Zeevi, 2009; Babaioff et al., 2015; Besbes and Zeevi, 2012; Wang et al., 2014), dynamic procurement
(Badanidiyuru et al., 2012; Singla and Krause, 2013) (a version of dynamic pricing where the algorithm
is a buyer rather than a seller), dynamic ad allocation (Slivkins, 2013; Combes et al., 2015), and a version
with a single resource and unlimited time (Gyo¨rgy et al., 2007; Tran-Thanh et al., 2010, 2012; Ding et al.,
2013). While all this work is on regret minimization, Guha and Munagala (2007); Gupta et al. (2011) studied
closely related Bayesian formulations.
Stochastic BwK was optimally solved using three different algorithms (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018; Agrawal
and Devanur, 2014), with extremely technical and delicate analyses. All three algorithms involve inherently
‘stochastic’ techniques such as “successive elimination” and “optimism under uncertainty”, and do not ap-
pear to extend to the adversarial version. One of them, PrimalDualBwK from Badanidiyuru et al. (2018),
is a primal-dual algorithm superficially similar to ours. Indeed, it decouples into two online learning al-
gorithms: a “primal” algorithm which chooses among arms, and a “dual” algorithm similar to ours, which
chooses among resources. However, the two algorithms are not playing a repeated game in any meaning-
ful sense, let alone a zero-sum game. The primal algorithm operates under a much richer input: it takes
the entire outcome vector for the chosen arm, as well as the “dual distribution” – the distribution over re-
sources chosen by the dual algorithm. Further, the primal algorithm is very problem-specific: it interprets
the dual distribution as a vector of costs over resources, and chooses arms with largest reward-to-cost ratios,
estimated using “optimism under uncertainty”.
Our approach to using regret minimization in games can be traced to Freund and Schapire (1996, 1999)
(see Ch. 6 in Schapire and Freund (2012)), who showed how a repeated zero-sum game played by two
agents yields an approximate Nash equilibrium. This approach has been used as a unifying algorithmic
framework for several problems: boosting (Freund and Schapire, 1996), linear programs (Arora et al., 2012),
maximum flow (Christiano et al., 2011), and convex optimization (Abernethy and Wang, 2017; Wang and
Abernethy, 2018). While we use a result with the 1/
√
t convergence rate for the equilibrium property,
recent literature obtains faster convergence for cumulative payoffs (but not for the equilibrium property)
under various assumptions (Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2013; Daskalakis et al., 2015; Wei and Luo, 2018).
Repeated Lagrangian games, in conjunction with regret minimization in games, have been used in a
series of recent papers (Rogers et al., 2015; Hsu et al., 2016; Roth et al., 2016; Kearns et al., 2018; Agarwal
et al., 2017; Roth et al., 2017), as an algorithmic tool to solve convex optimization problems; application
domains range from differential privacy to algorithmic fairness to learning from revealed preferences. All
these papers deal with deterministic games (i.e., same game matrix in all rounds). Reframing the problem
in terms of repeated Lagrangian games is a key technical insight in this work. Most related to our paper are
Roth et al. (2016, 2017), where a repeated Lagrangian game is used as a subroutine (the “inner loop”) in
an online algorithm; the other papers solve an offline problem. We depart from this prior work in several
respects. Our main results are for the adversarial version, where the standard machinery does not apply and
we provide a very different analysis. For the stochastic version, we use a stochastic game and we deal with
some subtleties specific to BwK.
Online packing problems (e.g., Buchbinder and Naor, 2009a,b; Devanur et al., 2011) can be seen as
a special case of Adversarial BwK with a much more permissive feedback model: the algorithm observes
full feedback (the outcomes for all actions) before choosing an action. Online packing subsumes various
online matching problems, including the AdWords problem (Mehta et al., 2007) motivated by ad allocation
(see Mehta, 2013, for a survey). While we derive O(log T ) competitive ratio against OPTFD, online packing
admits a similar result against OPTDP.
Another related line of work concerns online convex optimization with constraints (Mahdavi et al., 2012,
2013; Chen et al., 2017; Neely and Yu, 2017; Chen and Giannakis, 2018). Their setting differs from ours
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in several important respects. First, the action set is a convex subset of RK (and the algorithms rely on the
power to choose arbitrary actions in this set). In particular, there is no immediate way to handle discrete
action sets.5 Second, convexity/concavity is assumed on the rewards and resource consumption. Third, full
feedback is observed for the resource consumption. Moreover, in all papers except Chen and Giannakis
(2018) one also observes either full feedback on rewards or the rewards gradient around the chosen action.
Fourth, their algorithm only needs to satisfy the budget constraints at the time horizon (whereas in BwK
the budget constraints hold for all rounds). Fifth, their fixed-distribution benchmark is weaker than ours:
essentially, its time-averaged consumption must be small enough at each round t. Due to these differences,
this setting admits sublinear regret for adversarial outcomes (Neely and Yu, 2017). The other papers in this
line of work focus on stochastic outcomes.
Logarithmic competitive ratios are quite common in prior work on approximation algorithms and online
algorithms. Examples include: set cover (Lova´sz, 1975; Johnson, 1974), buy-at-bulk network design (Awer-
buch and Azar, 1997), sparsest cut (Arora et al., 2009), the dial-a-ride problem (Charikar and Raghavachari,
1998), online k-server (Bansal et al., 2011), online packing/covering (Azar et al., 2016), online set cover
(Alon et al., 2003), online network design (Umboh, 2015), and online paging (Fiat et al., 1991).
2.1 Simultaneous and subsequent work
Three very recent papers have come to our attention after the initial version of our paper has appeared on
arxiv.org as Immorlica et al. (2018). At the time, Rivera et al. (2018); Rangi et al. (2019) have been
available as yet unpublished technical reports, and Cardoso et al. (2019) has not yet appeared.
Rivera et al. (2018) consider online convex optimization with knapsacks: essentially, the problem de-
fined in Section 7.4, but with full feedback. Focusing on the stochastic version, they design an algorithm sim-
ilar to LagrangeBwK, and derive a regret bound similar to ours, using a similar analysis. They also claim
an extension to bandit feedback, without providing any details (such as the precise statement of Lemma 3.1
in terms of the regret property (3.2)).
Rangi et al. (2019) consider Adversarial BwK in the special case when there is only one constrained
resource, including time. They attain sublinear regret, i.e., a regret bound that is sublinear in T . They also
assume a known lower bound cmin > 0 on realized per-round consumption of each resource, and their
regret bound scales as 1/cmin. They also achieve polylog(T ) instance-dependent regret for the stochastic
version using the same algorithm (matching results from prior work on the stochastic version). BwK with
only one constrained resource (including time) is a much easier problem, compared to the general case
with multiple resources studied in this paper, in the following sense. First, the single-resource version
admits much stronger performance guarantees (polylog(T ) vs.
√
T regret bounds for Stochastic BwK, and
sublinear regret vs. competitive ratio for Adversarial BwK). Second, the optimal all-knowing time-invariant
policy is the best fixed arm, rather than the best fixed distribution over arms.
Cardoso et al. (2019) study online learning in repeated adversarial zero-sum games (which is our main
technical tool). They obtain a powerful result for arbitrary games: an online learning algorithm which
controls both players and guarantees convergence to the Nash equilibrium. They apply their framework
to train Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). Interestingly, they achieve the competitive ratio of 1,
despite the adversarial setting. Their algorithm can continue up to round T , with no stopping rule like in
BwK; for this reason, their results do not have an immediate bearing on our problem.
5Unless there is full feedback, in which case one can use a standard reduction whereby actions in online convex optimization
correspond to distributions over actions in a K-armed bandit problem.
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3 Preliminaries
We use bold fonts to represent vectors and matrices. We use standard notation whereby, for a positive integer
K, [K] stands for {1, 2 , . . . ,K}, and ∆K denotes the set of all probability distributions on [K]. Some of
the notation introduced further is summarized in Appendix B.
Bandits with Knapsacks (BwK). There are T rounds, K possible actions and d resources, indexed as
[T ], [K], [d], respectively. In each round t ∈ [T ], the algorithm chooses an action at ∈ [K] and receives an
outcome vector ot = (rt; ct,1 , . . . , ct,d) ∈ [0, 1]d+1, where rt is a reward and ct,i is consumption of each
resource i ∈ [d]. Each resource i is endowed with budget Bi ≤ T . The game stops early, at some round
τalg < T , when/if the total consumption of any resource exceeds its budget. The algorithm’s objective is to
maximize its total reward. Without loss of generality all budgets are the same: B1 = B2 = . . . = Bd = B.6
The outcome vectors are chosen as follows. In each round t, the adversary chooses the outcome matrix
M t ∈ [0, 1]K×(d+1), where rows correspond to actions. The outcome vector ot is defined as the at-th row of
this matrix, denotedM t(at). Only this row is revealed to the algorithm. The adversary is deterministic and
oblivious, meaning that the entire sequence M1 , . . . ,MT is chosen before round 1. A problem instance
of BwK consists of (known) parameters (d,K, T,B), and the (unknown) sequenceM1 , . . . ,MT .
In the stochastic version of BwK, henceforth termed Stochastic BwK, each outcome matrixM t is chosen
from some fixed but unknown distribution DBwK over the outcome matrices. An instance of this problem
consists of (known) parameters (d,K, T,B), and the (unknown) distribution DBwK.
Following prior work (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018; Agrawal and Devanur, 2014), we assume, w.l.o.g., that
one of the resources is a dummy resource similar to time; formally, each action consumes B/T units of this
resource per round (we only need this for Stochastic BwK). Further, we posit that one of the actions is a
null action, which lets the algorithm skips a round: it has 0 reward and consumes 0 amount of each resource
other than the dummy resource.
Benchmarks. Let REW(ALG) =
∑
t∈[τalg] rt be the total reward of algorithm ALG in the BwK problem.
Our benchmark is the best fixed distribution, a distribution over actions which maximizes E[REW(·)] for a
particular problem instance. The expected total reward of this distribution is denoted OPTFD.
For Stochastic BwK, one can compete with the best dynamic policy: an algorithm that maximizes
E[REW(·)] for a particular problem instance. Essentially, this algorithm knows the latent distribution DBwK
over outcome matrices. Its expected total reward is denoted OPTDP.
Adversarial online learning. To state the framework of “regret minimization in games” below, we need to
introduce the protocol of adversarial online learning, see Figure 1.
In this protocol, the adversary can use previously chosen arms to choose the payoff vector f t, but not the
algorithm’s random seed. The distribution f t is chosen as a deterministic function of history. (The history at
round t consists, for each round s < t, of the chosen action as and the observed feedback in this round.) We
focus on two feedback models: bandit feedback (no auxiliary feedback) and full feedback (the entire payoff
vector f t). The version for costs can be defined similarly, by setting the payoffs to be the negative of costs.
We are interested in adversarial online learning algorithms with known upper bounds on regret,
RAOL(T ) :=
[
maxa∈A
∑
t∈[T ] ft(a)
]
−
[∑
t∈[T ] ft(at)
]
. (3.1)
The benchmark here is the total payoff of the best arm, according to the payoff vectors actually chosen by
6To see that this is indeed w.l.o.g., for each resource i, divide all per-round consumptions ct,i byBi/B, whereB := mini∈[d]Bi
is the smallest budget. In the modified problem instance, all consumptions still lie in [0, 1], and all the budgets are equal to B.
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Given: action set A, payoff range [bmin, bmax].
In each round t ∈ [T ],
1. the adversary chooses a payoff vector f t ∈ [bmin, bmax]K ;
2. the algorithm chooses a distribution pt over A, without observing f t,
3. algorithm’s chosen action at ∈ A is drawn independently from pt;
4. payoff ft(at) is received by the algorithm.
Figure 1: Adversarial online learning
the adversary. More precisely, we assume high-probability regret bounds of the following form:
∀δ > 0 Pr [ RAOL(T ) ≤ (bmax − bmin)Rδ(T ) ] ≥ 1− δ, (3.2)
for some function Rδ(·). We will actually use a stronger version implied by (3.2),7
∀δ > 0 Pr [ ∀τ ∈ [T ] RAOL(τ) ≤ (bmax − bmin)Rδ/T (T ) ] ≥ 1− δ. (3.3)
Algorithms EXP3.P (Auer et al., 2002) for bandit feedback, and Hedge (Freund and Schapire, 1997) for full
feedback, satisfy (3.2) with, resp.,
Rδ(T ) = O
(√
|A|T log(T/δ)
)
and Rδ(T ) = O
(√
T log(|A|/δ)
)
. (3.4)
Regret minimization in games. We build on the framework of regret minimization in games. A zero-sum
game (A1, A2,G) is a game between two players i ∈ {1, 2} with action sets A1 and A2 and payoff matrix
G ∈ RA1×A2 . If each player i chooses an action ai ∈ Ai, the outcome is a number G(a1, a2). Player 1
receives this number as reward, and player 2 receives it as cost. A repeated zero-sum game G with action sets
A1 and A2, time horizon T and game matricesG1 , . . . ,GT ∈ RA1×A2 is a game between two algorithms,
ALG1 and ALG2, which proceeds over T rounds such that each round t is a zero-sum game (A1, A2,Gt).
The goal of ALG1 is to maximize the total reward, and the goal of ALG2 is to minimize the total cost.
The game G is called stochastic if the game matrix Gt in each round t is drawn independently from
some fixed distribution. For such games, we are interested in the expected game, defined by the expected
game matrixG = E[Gt]. We can relate the algorithms’ performance to the minimax value ofG.
Lemma 3.1. Consider a stochastic repeated zero-sum game between algorithms ALG1 and ALG2, with pay-
off range [bmin, bmax]. Assume that each ALGj , j ∈ {1, 2} is an algorithm for adversarial online learning,
as per Figure 1, which satisfies regret bound (3.2) with Rδ(T ) = Rj,δ(T ).
Let τ be some fixed round in the game. For each algorithm ALGj , j ∈ {1, 2}, let Aj be its action set,
let pt,j ∈ ∆Aj be the distribution chosen in each round t, and let p¯j = 1τ
∑
t∈[τ ] pt,j be the average play
distribution at round τ . Let v∗ be the minimax value for the expected gameG = E[Gt].
Then for each δ > 0, with probability at least 1− 2δ it holds that
∀p2 ∈ ∆A2 p¯T1 Gp2 ≥ v∗ − 1τ (bmax − bmin)
(
R1, δ/T (T ) +R2, δ/T (T ) + 4
√
2T log(T/δ)
)
. (3.5)
7Regret bound (3.3) follows from (3.2) using a simple “zeroing-out” trick: for a given round τ ∈ [T ], the adversary can set all
future payoffs to some fixed value x ∈ [bmin, bmax], in which case RAOL(τ) = RAOL(T ).
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Eq. (3.5) states that the average play of player 1 is approximately optimal against any distribution chosen
by player 2.8 This lemma is well-known for the deterministic case (i.e., when Gt = G for each round t),
and folklore for the stochastic case. We provide a proof in Appendix A.4 for the sake of completeness.
4 A new algorithm for Stochastic BwK
We present a new algorithm for Stochastic BwK, based on the framework of regret minimization in games.
This is a very natural algorithm once the single-shot game is set up, and it allows for a very clean regret
analysis. We will also use this algorithm as a subroutine for the adversarial version.
On a high level, we define a stochastic zero-sum game for which a mixed Nash equilibrium corresponds
to an optimal solution for a linear relaxation of the original problem. Our algorithm consists of two regret-
minimizing algorithms playing this game. The framework of regret minimization in games guarantees that
the average primal and dual play distributions (p¯1 and p¯2 in Lemma 3.1) approximate the mixed Nash
equilibrium in the expected game, which correspondingly approximates the optimal solution.
4.1 Linear relaxation and Lagrange functions
We start with a linear relaxation of the problem that all prior work relies on. This relaxation is stated in terms
of expected rewards/consumptions, i.e., implicitly, in terms of the expected outcome matrix M = E[M t].
We explicitly formulate the relaxation in terms ofM , and this is essential for the subsequent developments.
For ease of notation, we write the a-th row ofM , for each action a ∈ [K], as
M(a) = (rM (a); cM1 (a) , . . . , c
M
d (a)),
so that rM (a) is the expected reward and cMi (a) is the expected consumption of each resource i.
Essentially, the relaxation assumes that each instantaneous outcome matrixM t is equal to the expected
outcome matrix M = E[M t]. The relaxation seeks the best distribution over actions, focusing on a single
round with budgets rescaled as B/T . This leads to the following linear program (LP):
maximize
∑
a∈[K]X(a) r
M (a) such that∑
a∈[K]X(a) = 1
∀i ∈ [d] ∑a∈[K]X(a) cMi (a) ≤ B/T
∀a ∈ [K] 0 ≤ X(a) ≤ 1.
(4.1)
We denote this LP by LPM ,B,T . The solution X is the best fixed distribution over actions, according to
the relaxation. The value of this LP, denoted OPTLP(M , B, T ), is the expected per-round reward of this
distribution. It is also the total reward of X in the relaxation, divided by T . We know from Badanidiyuru
et al. (2018) that
T · OPTLP(M , B, T ) ≥ OPTDP ≥ OPTFD, (4.2)
where OPTDP and OPTFD are the total expected rewards of, respectively, the best dynamic policy and the
best fixed distribution. In words, OPTDP is sandwiched between the total expected reward of the best fixed
distribution and that of its linear relaxation.
8If each player j chooses distribution pj ∈ ∆Aj , and the game matrix is G, then expected reward/cost is pT1Gp2.
10
Associated with the linear program LPM ,B,T is the Lagrange function L = LM ,B,T . It is a function
L : ∆K × Rd≥0 → R defined as
L(X,λ) :=
∑
a∈[K]
X(a) rM (a) +
∑
i∈[d]
λi
1− T
B
∑
a∈[K]
X(a) cMi (a)
 . (4.3)
The values λ1 , . . . , λd in Eq. (4.3) are called the dual variables, as they correspond to the variables in the
dual LP. Lagrange functions are meaningful due to their max-min property (e.g., Theorem D.2.2 in Ben-Tal
and Nemirovski (2001)):
min
λ≥0
max
X∈∆K
L(X,λ) = max
X∈∆K
min
λ≥0
L(X,λ) = OPTLP(M , B, T ). (4.4)
This property holds for our setting because LPM ,B,T has at least one feasible solution (namely, one that
puts probability one on the null action), and the optimal value of the LP is bounded.
Remark 4.1. We use the linear program LPM ,B,T and the associated Lagrange function LM ,B,T through-
out the paper. Both are parameterized by an outcome matrixM , budgetB and time horizon T . In particular,
we can plug in an arbitraryM , and we heavily use this ability throughout. For the adversarial version, it is
essential to plug in parameter T0 ≤ T instead of the time horizon T . For the analysis of the high-probability
result in Adversarial BwK, we use a rescaled budget B0 ≤ B instead of budget B.
4.2 Our algorithm: repeated Lagrangian game
The Lagrange function L = LM ,B,T from (4.3) defines the following zero-sum game: the primal player
chooses an arm a, the dual player chooses a resource i, and the payoff is a number
L(a, i) = rM (a) + 1− TB cMi (a). (4.5)
The primal player receives this number as a reward, and the dual player receives it as cost. This game is
termed the Lagrangian game induced by LM ,B,T . This game will be crucial throughout the paper.
The Lagrangian game is related to the original linear program as follows:
Lemma 4.2. Assume one of the resources is the dummy resource. Consider the linear program LPM ,B,T ,
for some outcome matrix M . Then the value of this LP equals the minimax value v∗ of the Lagrangian
game induced by LM ,B,T . Further, if (X,λ) is a mixed Nash equilibrium in the Lagrangian game, thenX
is an optimal solution to the LP.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.2. The idea is that because of the special structure of the LP, the
second equality in (4.4) also holds when the dual vector λ is restricted to distributions.
Consider a repeated version of the Lagrangian game. Formally, the repeated Lagrangian game with
parameters B0 ≤ B and T0 ≤ T is a repeated zero-sum game between the primal algorithm that chooses
among arms and the dual algorithm that chooses among resources. Each round t of this game is the La-
grangian game induced by the Lagrange function Lt := LM t,B0,T0 , where M t is the round-t outcome
matrix. Note that we use parameters B0, T0 instead of budget B and time horizon T .9
9These parameters are needed only for the adversarial version. For Stochastic BwK we use B0 = B and T0 = T .
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Remark 4.3. Consider repeated Lagrangian game for Stochastic BwK (with B0 = B and T0 = T ). The
payoffs in the expected game are defined by the expected Lagrange function L := E[Lt]. By linearity, L is
the Lagrange function for the expected outcome matrixM = E[M t]:
L := E[Lt] = LM ,B,T . (4.6)
Our algorithm, called LagrangeBwK, is very simple: it is a repeated Lagrangian game in which the
primal algorithm receives bandit feedback, and the dual algorithm receives full feedback.
To set up the notation, let at and it be, respectively, the chosen arm and resource in round t. The payoff
is therefore Lt(at, it). It can be rewritten in terms of the observed outcome vector ot = (rt; ct,1 , . . . , ct,d)
(which corresponds to the at-th row of the instantaneous outcome matrixM t):
Lt(at, it) = rt + 1− T0B0 ct,it ∈ [− T0B0 + 1, 2]. (4.7)
Note that the payoff range is [bmin, bmax] = [− T0B0 + 1].
With this notation, the pseudocode for LagrangeBwK is summarized in Algorithm 1. The pseudocode
is simple and self-contained, without referring to the formalism of repeated games and Lagrangian functions.
Note that the algorithm is implementable, in the sense that the outcome vector ot revealed in each round t
of the BwK problem suffices to generate full feedback for the dual algorithm.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm LagrangeBwK for Stochastic BwK.
input: parameters B0, T0, primal algorithm ALG1, dual algorithm ALG2.
// ALG1, ALG2 are adversarial online learning algorithms
// with bandit feedback and full feedback, respectively
for round t = 1, 2, 3, . . . do
1. ALG1 returns arm at ∈ [K], algorithm ALG2 returns resource it ∈ [d].
2. arm at is chosen, outcome vector ot = (rt(at); ct,1(at) , . . . , ct,d(at)) ∈ [0, 1]d+1 is observed.
3. The payoff Lt(at, it) from (4.7) is reported to ALG1 as reward, and to ALG2 as cost.
4. The payoff Lt(at, i) is reported to ALG2 for each resource i ∈ [d].
4.3 Performance guarantees
We consider algorithm LagrangeBwK with parameter T0 = T . We assume the existence of the dummy
resource; this is to ensure that the crucial step, Eq. (4.13), works out even if the algorithm stops at time T ,
without exhausting any actual resources. We obtain a regret bound that is non-trivial wheneverB > Ω(
√
T ),
and is optimal, up to log factors, in the regime when min(OPTDP, B) > Ω(T ).
Theorem 4.4. Consider Stochastic BwK with K arms, d resources, time horizon T , and budget B. Assume
that one resource is the dummy resource (with consumption BT for each arm). Fix the failure probability
parameter δ ∈ (0, 1). Consider algorithm LagrangeBwK with parameters B0 = B, T0 = T .
If EXP3.P and Hedge are used as the primal and the dual algorithms, respectively, then the algorithm
achieves the following regret bound, with probability at least 1− δ:
OPTDP − REW(LagrangeBwK) ≤ O
(
T
B
√
TK log(dT/δ)
)
. (4.8)
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In general, suppose each algorithm ALGj satisfies a regret bound (3.2) with Rδ(T ) = Rj,δ(T ) and
payoff range [bmin, bmax] = [− TB + 1, 2]. Then with probability at least 1−O(δT ) it holds that
OPTDP − REW(LagrangeBwK) ≤ O
(
T
B
) (
R1, δ/T (T ) +R2, δ/T (T ) +
√
T log(dT/δ)
)
. (4.9)
Remark 4.5. To obtain (4.8) from the “black-box” result (4.9), we use regret bounds in Eq. (3.4).
Remark 4.6. From Badanidiyuru et al. (2018), the optimal regret bound for Stochastic BwK is
OPTDP − E[REW] ≤ O˜
(√
KOPTDP (1 +
√
OPTDP/B)
)
.
Thus, the regret bound (4.8) is near-optimal if min(OPTDP, B) > Ω(T ), and non-trivial if B > Ω(
√
T ).
We next prove the “black-box” regret bound (4.9). For the sake of analysis, consider a version of the
repeated Lagrangian game that continues up to the time horizon T . In what follows, we separate the “easy
steps” from what we believe is the crux of the proof.
Notation. Let Xt be the distribution chosen in round t by the primal algorithm ALG1. Let Xτ :=
1
τ
∑
t∈[τ ]Xt be the distribution of average play up to round τ . Let M = E[M t] be the expected out-
come matrix. Let r = (rM (a) : a ∈ [K]) be the vector of expected rewards over the actions. Likewise,
ci = (c
M
i (a) : a ∈ [K]) be the vector of expected consumption of each resource i ∈ [d].
Using Azuma-Hoeffding inequality. Consider the first τ rounds, for some τ ∈ [T ]. The average reward
and resource-i consumption over these rounds are close to Xτ · r and Xτ · ci, respectively, with high
probability. Specifically, a simple usage of Azuma-Hoeffding inequality (Lemma A.1) implies that
1
τ
∑
t∈[τ ] rt ≥Xτ · r −R0(τ)/τ, (4.10)
1
τ
∑
t∈[τ ] ci,t ≤Xτ · ci +R0(τ)/τ, ∀i ∈ [d], (4.11)
hold with probability at least 1− δ, where R0(τ) = O(
√
τ log(d/δ)).
Regret minimization in games. Let us apply the machinery from regret minimization in games to the
repeated Lagrangian game. Consider the game matrix G of the expected game. Using Eq. (4.6) and
Lemma 4.2, we conclude that the minimax value ofG is v∗ = OPTLP(M , B, T ).
We apply Lemma 3.1, with a fixed stopping time τ ∈ [T ]. Recall that the payoff range is bmax− bmin =
T
B + 1. Thus, with probability at least 1− 2δ it holds that
λ ∈ ∆d : XTτ Gλ ≥ v∗ − 1τ ( TB + 1) · reg(T ), (4.12)
where the regret term is reg(T ) := R1, δ/T (T ) +R2, δ/T (T ) + 4
√
2T log(T/δ).
Crux of the proof. Let us condition on the event that (4.10), (4.11), and (4.12) hold for each τ ∈ [T ]. By
the union bound, this event holds with probability at least 1− 3δT .
Let τ denote the stopping time of the algorithm, the first round when the total consumption of some
resource exceeds its budget. Let i be the resource for which this happens; hence,∑
t∈[τ ] ci,t > B. (4.13)
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Let us use Eq. (4.12) with λ = λ(i), the point distribution for this resource. Then
X
T
τ Gλ
(i) = LM ,B,T (Xτ ,λ(i)) (by Eq. (4.6))
= Xτ · r + 1− TB Xτ · ci (by definition of Lagrange function)
≤ 1τ
((∑
t∈[τ ] rt
)
−
(
T
B
∑
t∈[τ ] ci,t
)
+ τ − (1 + TB )R0(τ)
)
(plugging in (4.10) and (4.11))
≤ 1τ
((∑
t∈[τ ] rt
)
+ τ − T − (1 + TB )R0(τ)
)
. (plugging in Eq. (4.13))
Plugging this into Eq. (4.12) and rearranging, we obtain∑
t∈[τ ] rt ≥ τ v∗ + T − τ − (1 + TB ) · reg(T ).
Since v∗ ≤ 1 (because v∗ = OPTLP, as we’ve proved above),
REW(LagrangeBwK) =
∑
t∈[τ ] rt ≥ T v∗ − (1 + TB ) · reg(T ).
The claimed regret bound (4.9) follows by Eq. (4.2), completing the proof of Theorem 4.4.
5 A simple algorithm for Adversarial BwK
We present and analyze an algorithm for Adversarial BwK which achieves d · log T competitive ratio, in
expectation, up to a low-order additive term. Our algorithm is very simple: we randomly guess the value
of OPTFD and run LagrangeBwK with parameter T0 driven by this guess. The analysis is very different,
however, since we cannot rely on the machinery from regret minimization in stochastic games. The crux of
the analysis (Lemma 5.8) is re-used to analyze the high-probability algorithm in the next section.
In hindsight, the intuition for our algorithm can be explained as follows. Since LagrangeBwK builds
on adversarial online learning algorithms ALGj , it appears plausibly applicable to Adversarial BwK. We
analyze it for an arbitrary parameter T0, and find that it performs best when T0 is tailored to OPTFD up to a
constant multiplicative factor. This is precisely what our algorithm achieves using the random guess.
Our algorithm is presented as Algorithm 2. We guess the value of OPTFD within a given range [gmin, gmax].
We guess OPTFD uniformly on the “exponential scale”: we draw the exponent u uniformly at random, and
define the guess as ĝ = gmin · κu, for some scale parameter κ > 1.10 We call LagrangeBwK with
T0 = ĝ/(d+ 1). Our analysis works as long as OPTFD ≤ gmax, with gmin appearing in the additive term.
Algorithm 2: A simple algorithm for Adversarial BwK.
input: scale parameter κ > 1, guess range [gmin, gmax], primal and dual algorithms ALG1, ALG2
// ALG1, ALG2 are adversarial online learning algorithms
// with bandit feedback and full feedback, resp.
Choose u uniformly at random from [0, umax], where umax = logκ
gmax
gmin
.
Guess the value of OPTFD as ĝ = gmin · κu.
Run LagrangeBwK with algorithms ALG1, ALG2 and parameters B0 = B and T0 = ĝ/(d+ 1).
10Surprisingly, our results do not depend on κ. The underlying reason is that the integral
∫ logκ x
0
κudu does not depend on κ.
14
Theorem 5.1. Consider Adversarial BwK withK arms, d resources, time horizon T , and budgetB. Assume
that one of the arms is a null arm that has zero reward and zero resource consumption. Consider Algorithm 2
with scale parameter κ > 1. Suppose algorithms ALGj that satisfy the regret bound (3.2) with δ = T−2 and
regret term Rδ(T ) = Rj,δ(T ), for any known payoff range [bmin, bmax].
(a) If OPTFD ≤ gmax then the expected reward of Algorithm 2 satisfies
E[REW] ≥ OPTFD − reg− gmin − 1
(d+ 1) ln gmaxgmin
, (5.1)
where reg = (1 + OPTFDdB )
(
R1, δ/T (T ) +R2, δ/T (T )
)
.
(b) In particular, taking [gmin, gmax] = [
√
T , T ], we obtain
E[REW] ≥ OPTFD − reg−
√
T − 1
1
2(d+ 1) · ln(T )
. (5.2)
Remark 5.2. One can use algorithms EXP3.P for ALG1 and Hedge for ALG2, with regret bounds given by
(3.4), and achieve the regret term reg = O
(
1 + OPTFDdB
) √
TK log(Td/δ). We obtain a meaningful per-
formance guarantee as long as, say, reg < OPTFD/2; this requires OPTFD and B to be at least Ω˜(
√
TK).
Remark 5.3. We define the outcome matrices slightly differently compared to Section 4 in that we do not
posit a dummy resource. Formally, we assume that the null arm has zero consumption in every resource.
This is essential for case 1 (i.e., when τalg ≤ σ) in the analysis of Lemma 5.8.
Remark 5.4. The log(T ) appears in the competitive ratio because the algorithm needs to guess OPTFD up
to a constant factor. The factor of d can be traced to a pessimistic over-estimate in (5.12).
Remark 5.5. The algorithm simplifies when d = 1, i.e., if there is only one resource other than time. Then
the outcome matrices have only one resource, so the dual algorithm ALG2 is no longer needed.
Remark 5.6. The problem can be reduced to the case d = 1, which simplifies the algorithm, as per Re-
mark 5.5, but increases the competitive ratio. The reduction is very simple: replacing all “true resources”
(i.e., all resources other than time) with the “maximal resource” whose consumption is the maximum over
the true resources.The competitive ratio, i.e., the denominator in Eq. (5.1), increases by the factor of 2dd+1 .
Moreover, the reduction can be wasteful if the maximal consumption (across all resources) is much larger
than a “typical” consumption of each resource. The analysis compares algorithm’s reward to the bench-
mark for the “fake problem” with d = 1, then compares the said benchmark to OPTFD. The former step is
essentially the analysis in Section 5.1, albeit in a slightly simpler form. We omit the easy details.
If a problem instance of Adversarial BwK is actually an instance of adversarial bandits, then we recover
the optimal O˜(
√
KT ) regret. (This easily follows by examining the proof of Lemma 5.8.)
Lemma 5.7. Consider LagrangeBwK, with algorithms EXP3.P for ALG1 and Hedge for ALG2, for an
instance of Adversarial BwK with zero resource consumption. This algorithm obtains O˜(
√
KT ) regret, for
any parameters B0, T0 > 0. Accordingly, so does Algorithm 2 with any scale parameter κ > 0.
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5.1 Analysis: proof of Theorem 5.1 and Lemma 5.7
Stopped linear program. Let us set up a linear relaxation that is suitable to the adversarial setting. The
expected outcome matrix is no longer available. Instead, we use average outcome matrices:
M τ =
1
τ
∑
t∈[τ ] M t, (5.3)
the average up to a given intermediate round τ ∈ [T ]. Similar to the stochastic case, the relaxation assumes
that each instantaneous outcome matrix M t is equal to the average outcome matrix M τ . What is different
now is that the relaxation depends on τ : usingM τ is tantamount to stopping precisely at this round.
With this intuition in mind, for a particular end-time τ we consider the linear program (4.1), parameter-
ized by the time horizon τ and the average outcome matrix M τ . Its value, OPTLP(M τ , B, τ), represents
the per-round expected reward, so it needs to be scaled by the factor of τ to obtain the total expected reward.
Finally, we maximize over τ . Thus, our linear relaxation for Adversarial BwK is defined as follows:
OPT
[T ]
LP := maxτ∈[T ] τ · OPTLP(M τ , B, τ) ≥ OPTFD. (5.4)
The inequality in (5.4) is proved in the appendix (Section A.3).
Regret bounds for ALGj . Since each algorithm ALGj , j ∈ {1, 2} satisfies regret bound (3.2) with δ = T−2
and Rδ(T ) = Rj,δ(T ), it also satisfies a stronger version (3.3) with the same parameters. Recall from (4.7)
that the payoff range is [bmin, bmax] = [−T0B + 1, 2]. For succinctness, let Uj(T |T0) = (1 + T0B )Rj, δ/T (T )
denote the respective regret term in (3.3).
Let us apply these regret bounds to our setting. Let at ∈ [K] and it ∈ [d] be, resp., the chosen arm
and resource in round t. We represent the outcomes as vectors over arms: rt, ct,i ∈ [0, 1]K denote, resp.,
reward vector and resource-i consumption vector for a given round t. Recall that the round-t payoffs in
LagrangeBwK are given by the Lagrange function Lt := LM t,B,T0 such that
Lt(a, i) = rt(a) + 1− T0B ct,i(a) (5.5)
for each arm a and resource i. Consider the total Lagrangian payoff at a given round τ ∈ [T ]:∑
t∈[τ ] Lt(at, it) = REWτ + τ −Wτ , (5.6)
where REWτ =
∑
t∈[τ ] rt(at) is the total reward up to round τ , and Wτ =
T0
B
∑
t∈[τ ] ct,it(at) is the con-
sumption term. The regret bounds sandwich (5.6) from above and below:max
a∈[K]
∑
t∈[τ ]
Lt(a, it)
− U1(T |T0) ≤ REWτ + τ −Wτ ≤
min
i∈[d]
∑
t∈[τ ]
Lt(at, i)
+ U2(T |T0). (5.7)
This holds for all τ ∈ [T ], with probability at least 1 − 2δ. The first inequality in (5.7) is due to the primal
algorithm, and the second is due to the dual algorithm. Call them primal and dual inequality, respectively.
Crux of the proof. We condition on the event that (5.7) holds for all τ ∈ [T ], which we call the clean
event. The crux of the analysis is encapsulated in the following lemma, which analyzes an execution of
LagrangeBwK with an arbitrary parameter T0 under the clean event.
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Lemma 5.8. Consider an execution of LagrangeBwK with B0 = B and an arbitrary parameter T0 such
that the clean event holds. Fix an arbitrary round σ ∈ [T ], and consider the LP value relative to this round:
f(σ) := OPTLP(Mσ, B, σ). (5.8)
The algorithm’s reward up to round σ satisfies
REWσ ≥ min(T0, σ · f(σ)− dT0)− ( U1(T |T0) + U2(T |T0) ) . (5.9)
Taking σ to be the maximizer in (5.4), algorithm’s reward satisfies
REW ≥ min(T0,OPTFD − dT0)− ( U1(T |T0) + U2(T |T0) ) . (5.10)
Eq. (5.9) is used, with a different σ, for the high-probability analysis in Section 6.
Proof. Let τalg be the stopping time of the algorithm. We consider two cases, depending on whether some
resource is exhausted at time σ. In both cases, we focus on the round min(τalg, σ).
Case 1: τalg ≤ σ and some resource is exhausted. Let us focus on round τ = τalg. If i is the exhausted
resource, then
∑
t∈[τ ] ct,i(at) > B. Let us apply the dual inequality in (5.7) for this resource:
REWτ + τ −Wτ − U2(T |T0) ≤
∑
t∈[τ ] Lt(at, i)
= REWτ + τ − T0B
∑
t∈[τ ] ct,i(at)
≤ REWτ + τ − T0.
It follows that Wτ ≥ T0 − U2(T |T0).
Now, let us apply the primal inequality in (5.7) for the null arm. Recall that the reward and consumption
for this arm is 0, so Lt(null, it) = 1 for each round t. Therefore,
REWτ + τ −Wτ + U1(T |T0) ≥
∑
t∈[τ ] Lt(null, it) = τ.
We conclude that REWτ ≥Wτ − U1(T |T0) ≥ T0 − U1(T |T0)− U2(T |T0).
Case 2: τalg ≥ σ. Let us focus on round σ. Consider the linear program LPMσ ,B,σ, and let X∗ ∈ ∆K
be an optimal solution to this LP. The primal inequality in (5.7) implies that
REWσ + σ −Wσ + U1(σ) ≥ maxa∈[K]
∑
t∈[σ] Lt(a, it)
≥∑t∈[σ]∑a∈[K]X∗(a) Lt(a, it)
= σ +
∑
t∈[σ]X
∗ · rt − T0B
∑
t∈[σ]X
∗ · ct,it
REWσ ≥ σ · f(σ)− T0B
∑
t∈[σ]X
∗ · ct,it − U1(T |T0). (5.11)
In the last inequality we used the fact that
∑
t∈[σ]X
∗ · rt = σ · f(σ) by optimality ofX∗.∑
t∈[σ]X
∗ · ct,i ≤ B for each resource i, sinceX∗ is a feasible solution for OPTLP(Mσ, B, σ). Then,∑
t∈[σ]X
∗ · ct,it ≤
∑
i∈[d]
∑
t∈[σ]X
∗ · ct,i ≤ dB. (5.12)
Plugging (5.12) into (5.11), we conclude that REWσ ≥ σ · f(σ)− dT0 − U1(T |T0).
Conclusions from the two cases imply (5.10), as claimed.
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Wrapping up (the easy version). f OPTFD ∈ [gmin, gmax], then some guess ĝ is approximately correct:
OPTFD/κ ≤ ĝ ≤ OPTFD. (5.13)
By Lemma 5.8, the algorithm’s execution with this guess, assuming the clean event, satisfies (5.10), where,
recalling that T0 = ĝ/(d+ 1), we have
min(T0,OPTFD − dT0) ≥ OPTFD
κ(d+ 1)
and T0 ≤ OPTFD
d+ 1
.
The regret term for this guess is
reg = U1(T |T0) + U2(T |T0) ≤ (1 + OPTFD(d+1)B ) (R1, δ/T (T ) +R2, δ/T (T )).
To complete the proof of (5.1) (with a much larger constant in the denominator), note that we obtain a
suitable guess ĝ with probability 1/
⌈
logκ
gmax
gmin
⌉
.
Wrapping up (optimizing the constants). Let us go beyond the “approximately right guess” in (5.13), and
account for contributions of every guess. In other words, let us integrate over the guesses.
Assume that OPTFD lies in the guess range [gmin, gmax]. Recall that the algorithm samples u uniformly
at random from the interval [0, umax]. Write
T0 = T0(u) = gmin · κu/(d+ 1),
reg = reg(u) = U1(T |T0(u)) + U2(T |T0(u)),
Λ(u) = min(T0(u),max(0,OPTFD − dT0(u))).
Then by Lemma 5.8, for a particular choice of u, the algorithm’s reward satisfies
E[REW | u] ≥ Λ(u)− reg(u)− 1, (5.14)
where the ‘-1’ term accounts for the complement of the “clean event”.
The Λ(u) term can be split into three cases as follows:
Λ(u) =

T0(u) if 0 ≤ u ≤ logκ OPTFDgmin ,
OPTFD − dT0(u) if logκ OPTFDgmin < u ≤ logκ
(
d+1
d · OPTFDgmin
)
,
0 otherwise.
(5.15)
So, we are only interested in u ≤ u∗ := logκ
(
d+1
d · OPTFDgmin
)
, where u∗ satisfies T0(u∗) = OPTFD/d.
Integrating the right-hand side of (5.14) over u, we obtain:
E[REW] ≥ 1
umax
∫ u∗
0
E[REW | u] du = 1
umax
∫ u∗
0
(Λ(u)− reg(u)− 1) du, (5.16)
where umax = logκ
gmax
gmin
as per the algorithm’s specification.
Using (5.15) and omitting the easy details, the main term Λ(u) integrates as follows:∫ u∗
0
Λ(u) du ≥ OPTFD − gmin
d+ 1
. (5.17)
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(We’ve only used the first “regime” in (5.15). As for the second ”regime” in (5.15), integrating over it only
improves (5.17) by a small additive term.)
To handle the regret term reg(u), note that it is non-decreasing with u, so
1
umax
∫ u∗
0
reg(u) du ≤ u
∗ · reg(u∗)
umax
≤ reg(u∗).
Plugging this into (5.16), we obtain
E[REW] ≥ OPTFD − gmin
d+ 1
− reg(u∗)− 1. (5.18)
Recalling that T0 = T0(u∗) = OPTFD/d, we have
reg(u∗) = U1(T |T0) + U2(T |T0) ≤ (1 + OPTFDdB ) (R1, δ/T (T ) +R2, δ/T (T )).
Finally, because of the −gmin term in (5.18), the assumption OPTFD ≥ gmin is redundant. This completes
the proof of Theorem 5.1(a).
Proof Sketch of Lemma 5.7. Recall that in the adversarial bandit setting we have ci,t = 0 for every i ∈ [d]
and every t ∈ [T ]. We re-analyze Lemma 5.8 with σ = T . Notice that case 1 never occurs. Thus we obtain
obtain Eq. (5.11) in case 2. Note that T0B
∑
t∈[σ]X
∗ · ct,it = 0 since ci,t = 0. Therefore, we obtain
REWT ≥ T · f(T )− U1(T |T0).
We now argue that T · f(T ) = maxa∈[K]
∑
t∈[T ] rt(a). Let X
∗ be the optimal distribution over the
arms. Thus
∑
t∈[T ]X
∗ · rt = T · f(T ). Note that since ci,t = 0 the only constraint on X∗ is that it lies in
∆K . Therefore the maximizer is a point distribution on maxa∈[K]
∑
t∈[T ] rt(a). This proof does not rely on
any specific value for B0, T0. The payoff range is [bmax, bmin] = [1, 2], so U1(T |T0) = O˜
(√
KT
)
.
6 High-probability algorithm for Adversarial BwK
We recover the O(d log T ) competitive ratio for Adversarial BwK, but with high probability rather than
merely in expectation. Our algorithm uses LagrangeBwK as a subroutine, and re-uses the adversarial
analysis thereof (Lemma 5.8). We do not optimize the regret term or the constant in the competitive ratio.
The algorithm is considerably more complicated compared to Algorithm 2. Instead of making one
random guess ĝ for the value of OPT[T ]LP , we iteratively refine this guess over time. The algorithm proceeds
in phases. In the beginning of each phase, we start a fresh instance of LagrangeBwK with parameter T0
defined by the current value of ĝ.11 We update the guess ĝ in each round (in a way specified later), and stop
the phase once ĝ becomes too large compared to its initial value in this phase. We invoke LagrangeBwK
with a rescaled budget B0 = B/Θ (log T ). Within each phase, we simulate the BwK problem with budget
B0: we stop LagrangeBwK once the consumption of some resource in this phase exceeds B0. For the
remainder of the phase, we play the null arm with probability 1 − γ0 and do uniform exploration with the
remaining probability, for some parameter γ0 ∈ (0, 1) (here and elsewhere, uniform exploration refers to
choosing each action with equal probability). The pseudocode is summarized in Algorithm 3.
11The idea of restarting the algorithm in each phase is similar to the standard “doubling trick” in the online machine learning
literature, but much more delicate in our setting.
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Algorithm 3: High-probability algorithm for Adversarial BwK.
input: scale parameter κ, exploration parameter γ0, primal algorithm ALG1, dual algorithm ALG2
// ALG1, ALG2 are adversarial online learning algorithms
// with bandit feedback and full feedback, resp.
Initialize ĝ = 1.
for each phase do
Start a fresh instance ALG of LagrangeBwK
with parameters B0 = B/2dlogκ T e and T0 = ĝ/(3ddlogκ T e).
for each round in this phase do
Recompute the global estimate ĝ
if ĝ > T0/κ then start a new phase
if consumption of all resources in this phase does not exceed B0 then
Play the action chosen by ALG, observe the outcome and report it back to ALG.
else
Choose the null arm with probability 1− γ0, do uniform exploration otherwise
To complete algorithm’s specification, let us define how to update the guess ĝ in each round t. The guess,
denoted ĝt, is an estimate for OPT
[t]
LP, as defined in (5.4). We form this estimate using a standard inverse
propensity scoring (IPS) technique. Let pt and at be, resp., the distribution and the arm chosen by the primal
algorithm in round t. The instantaneous outcome matrix M t is estimated by matrix M
ips
t ∈ [0,∞)K×d
such that each rowMipst (a) is defined as follows:
Mipst (a) := 1{at=a}
1
ft(at)
M t(a).
For a given end-time τ , the average outcome matrixM τ from (5.3) is estimated as
M
ips
τ :=
1
τ
∑
t∈[τ ]M
ips
t .
Finally, we plug this estimate into (5.3) and define
ĝt := maxτ∈[T ] τ · OPTLP(Mipsτ , B, τ). (6.1)
For the analysis, we will assume that the primal algorithm does some uniform exploration:
pt(a) ≥ γ > 0 for each arm a ∈ [K] and each round t ∈ [T ]. (6.2)
Theorem 6.1. Consider Adversarial BwK withK arms, d resources, time horizon T , and budgetB; assume
B > 4T 3/4. Suppose that one of the arms is a null arm that has zero reward and zero resource consumption.
Let δ > 0 be the failure probability parameter.
Consider Algorithm 3 with parameters κ = 2 and γ0 = T−1/4. Assume that each algorithm ALGj ,
j ∈ {1, 2}, satisfies the regret bound (3.2) with payoff range [bmin, bmax] = [− TB + 1, 2] and regret term
Rδ(T ) = Rj,δ(T ). Assume that the primal algorithm ALG1 satisfies (6.2) with parameter γ ≥ T−1/4.
Then the total reward REW collected by Algorithm 3 satisfies
Pr
[
REW ≥ OPTFD − reg
O(d log T )
]
≥ 1−O(δT ), (6.3)
where the regret term is reg = TB
(
K T 3/4 log1/2(1δ ) +R1, δ/T (T ) +R2, δ/T (T )
)
.
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Remark 6.2. Using algorithms EXP3.P for ALG1 and Hedge for ALG2, we can achieve (6.3) with
reg = O
(
TK
B
)
T 3/4
√
log(T/δ).
This is because EXP3.P, with appropriately modified uniform exploration term γ = T−1/4, satisfies the
regret bound (3.2) with Rδ(τ) = O(T 3/4)
√
K log Tδ , and for Hedge we can (still) use Eq. (3.4). The
theorem is meaningful whenever, say, reg < OPTFD/2. The latter requires OPTFD · BK > Ω˜(T 7/4).
Remark 6.3. Like in Theorem 5.1, we posit that the null arm does not consume any resources.
Proof Sketch. The proof consists of several steps. First, we argue that the guess ĝt is close to OPT
[t]
LP with
high probability. This argument only relies on the uniform exploration property (6.1) and the definition of
IPS estimators, not on any properties of the algorithm. We immediately obtain concentration for the average
outcome matrices; a somewhat subtle point is to derive concentration on the respective LP-values.
Next, we focus on a particular phase in the execution of the algorithm. We say that a phase is full if the
stopping condition ĝt > T0/κ has fired. We focus on the last full phase. We prove there is enough reward
to be collected in this phase. Essentially, letting τ1, τ2 be, resp., the start and end time of this phase, we
consider the BwK problem restricted to time interval [τ1, τ2], and lower-bound the LP-value of this problem
in terms of the LP-value of the original problem. Finally, we use the adversarial analysis of LagrangeBwK
(Lemma 5.8) to guarantee that our algorithm actually collects that value.
Because of the stopping condition ĝt > T0/κ, there can be at most dlogκ T e phases. Therefore, rescaling
the budget to B0/2dlogκ T e guarantees that the algorithm consumes at most B/2 of the budget. We then
argue that, with high-probability, the additional uniform exploration in each phase, consumes a budget of at
most B/2 with high-probability. Thus, the algorithm never runs out of budget.
We now describe the full proof of Theorem 6.1, following the plan outlined in the proof sketch. We
decompose the analysis into several distinct pieces, present them one by one, and then show how to put
them together. Each piece is presented as a lemma, with appropriate notation and intuition; some of the
proofs are deferred to later in this section. Throughout, we assume that
min{OPTFD, B} > Ω
(
KT 3/4 log Tδ
)
. (6.4)
This is without loss of generality, because otherwise the guarantee in Theorem 6.1 is vacuous. Recall that
the primal algorithm ALG1 satisfies the uniform exploration property (6.1) with parameter γ ≥ T−1/4.
Extended notation. To argue about a given phase, we extend some of our notation to refer to arbitrary time
intervals, not just [1, τ ]. In what follows, fix time interval [τ1, τ2], and let ∆τ = τ2 − τ1 + 1. Let
M [τ1,τ2] :=
1
∆τ
τ2∑
t=τ1
M t,
M
ips
[τ1,τ2] :=
1
∆τ
τ2∑
t=τ1
Mipst
be, resp., the average outcome matrix and its IPS-estimate on this time interval. Define
OBJ([τ1, τ2]) := ∆τ · OPTLP(M [τ1,τ2], B,∆τ), (6.5)
OBJips([τ1, τ2]) := ∆τ · OPTLP(Mips[τ1,τ2], B,∆τ). (6.6)
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When τ1 = 1 we use the short-hand OBJ(τ2) and OBJips(τ2). Recall that
OPT
[τ ]
LP := max
τ∈[T ]
OBJ(τ). (6.7)
ĝτ := max
τ∈[T ]
OBJips(τ). (6.8)
Uniform exploration does not exhaust budget. The uniform exploration in Algorithm 3 happens for at
most γ0 T rounds in expectation, and therefore for at most γ0 T +3
√
γ0T ln(1/δ) rounds with probability at
least 1−δ.12 It does not consume more thanB/2 units of each resource, since γ0 = T−1/4 andB > 4T 3/4.
IPS estimators are good. We argue that, essentially, the guess ĝτ is close to OPT
[τ ]
LP with high probability.
More precisely, we prove that OBJ(τ) is close to its IPS estimator, for any given τ ∈ [T ]. We will denote
the deviation term as
DEV(τ) := C0
(
K · OBJ(τ)
γB
√
τ log Tδ
)
, (6.9)
for a sufficiently large absolute constant C0. Thus, DEV(τ) ≤ O
(
K T 7/4
B
√
log Tδ
)
(:= DEV(T )).
In this notation, we characterize the IPS estimators as follows:
Lemma 6.4. With probability at least 1− dδT it holds that
∀τ ∈ [T ] OBJips(τ)− DEV(τ) ≤ OBJ(τ) ≤ OBJips(τ) + DEV(τ). (6.10)
If the event (6.10) holds, then ĝτ and OPT
[τ ]
LP are indeed close:
∀τ ∈ [T ]
∣∣∣ĝτ − OPT[τ ]LP∣∣∣ ≤ max
t∈[τ ]
DEV(t). (6.11)
The proof only relies on the uniform exploration property (6.1) and the definition of IPS estimators, not
on anything that the algorithm does. A somewhat subtle point is to derive concentration on the respective
LP-values from concentration of the average outcome matrices.
IPS estimators do not change too fast. We use the stopping condition in the algorithm to argue that the
IPS estimators OBJips(·) do not change too fast from one phase to another, in some specific sense. Namely,
we compare OBJips(·) in the first round of any full phase to the guess in the last round of the next phase.
Lemma 6.5. Consider a full phase in the execution of the algorithm. Let τ be the first round in this phase,
and let τ ′ be any round in the next phase. Then
1
κ2
≤ OBJ
ips(τ)
ĝτ ′
≤ 1
κ
+
K
γĝτ ′
. (6.12)
Proof. There exists a j ∈ {1, 2 , . . . , dlogκ T e} such that OBJips(τ) ≥ κj . Since τ is the beginning of a
phase, this implies that OBJips(τ − 1) < κj−1. Observe that in a single time-step the value of the estimate
can increase by at most Kγ . Thus OBJ
ips(τ) < κj−1 + Kγ . Moreover since τ
′ belongs to the next phase, we
have that κj+1 ≤ ĝτ ′ ≤ κj+2. Putting these together we get that
1
κ2
≤ OBJ
ips(τ)
ĝτ ′
≤ 1
κ
+
K
γκj+1
≤ 1
κ
+
K
γĝτ ′
.
12By an easy application of Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds (Lemma A.2).
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This Lemma relies only on the stopping condition in the algorithm, ĝ > T0/κ, and the way the guess
ĝτ is expressed in terms of the IPS estimators OBJips(·), as expressed in Eq. (6.8). It is irrelevant to this
Lemma how the IPS estimators OBJips(·) are actually defined.
Last full phase offers sufficient rewards. Recall that a phase in the execution of the algorithm is called
full if the stopping condition ĝt > T0/κ has fired. We focus on the last full phase; let τstart, τend denote the
first and last time-steps of this phase. We prove there is enough reward to be collected in this phase.
Let τ∗ denote the maximizer in Eq. (5.4) which we interpret as the optimal stopping time. Essentially,
we compare the LP value for the time interval [τstart, τend] with the LP value for the time interval [1, τ∗].
The former is expressed as OBJ([τstart, τend]) and the latter as OPT
[T ]
LP . Note that the time horizon T lies in
the subsequent phase (so we can apply Lemma 6.5).
Lemma 6.6. Consider a run of the algorithm such that event (6.10) holds. Then
OBJ([τstart, τend]) ≥
(
1
κ
− 1
κ2
)
OPT
[T ]
LP −O(DEV(T )). (6.13)
Adversarial analysis of LagrangeBwK. Let us plug in the adversarial analysis of LagrangeBwK, as
encapsulated in Lemma 5.8. We focus on the last full phase in the execution. We interpret it as an execution
of algorithm LagrangeBwK with parameters B0, T0 on an instance of Adversarial BwK with budget B0
that starts at round τstart of the original problem. Let ĝ = ĝτstart be the guess at the first round of the phase.
Then the parameters are B0 = B/ratio and T0 = ĝ/(3d · ratio), where ratio = dlogκ T e.
We apply Lemma 5.8 for round σ = τend − τstart + 1 in the execution of LagrangeBwK. Restated in
our notation, f(σ) in Lemma 5.8 becomes
f(σ) = OPTLP(M [τstart,τend], B0, σ).
Thus, we obtain that with probability at least 1− δ we have
REW ≥
τend∑
t=τstart
rt(at) ≥ min
(
ĝ
3ddlogκ T e
, σf(σ)− dĝ
3ddlogκ T e
)
− reg(T ), (6.14)
where the regret term is reg(T ) := (1 + TB )
(
R1, δ/T (T ) +R2, δ/T (T )
)
.
Rescaling the budget. Since we use rescaled budget B0, it is important to connect the corresponding LP-
values to those for the original budget B. We have the following general fact (observed in Agrawal and
Devanur, 2014): for any outcome matrix M , budget B, time horizon T , and rescaling factor ψ ∈ (0, 1] it
holds that
OPTLP (M , ψB, T ) ≥ ψ · OPTLP (M , B, T ) . (6.15)
This holds because an optimal solution µ to LPM ,B,T , the vector ψµ is feasible to LPM ,ψB,T .
Putting it all together. We defer the proofs of Lemma 6.4 and Lemma 6.6 to the following subsections, and
show how to complete the proof of Theorem 6.1 assuming these Lemmas hold.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Throughout this proof, let us condition on the high-probability events in Lemma 6.4
and Eq. (6.14). Moreover from Eq. (6.15) we have that σf(σ) ≥ 1ratioOBJ([τstart, τend]) since B0 =
B
ratio . Thus combining this with Eq. (6.14) we get,
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REW =
τend∑
t=τstart
rt(at) ≥ 1
ratio
min
(
ĝ
3d
,OBJ([τstart, τend])− dĝ
3d
)
− reg(T ). (6.16)
Further from Lemma 6.6 with κ = 2, we can re-write Eq. (6.16) as
REW ≥ 1ratio min
(
ĝ
3d ,
(
1
κ − 1κ2
)
OPT
[T ]
LP − ĝ3
)
− reg(T ). (6.17)
Recall that ĝ for the phase [τstart, τend] is OBJips(τstart). Moreover we have that T lies in the phase
immediately after [τstart, τend].
Thus from Eq. (6.12) (first inequality below) and Eq. (6.11) (second inequality below) we have,
ĝ ≤ 1
κ
ĝT +
K
γ
≤ 1
κ
OPT
[T ]
LP +O(DEV(T )). (6.18)
Likewise we have,
ĝ ≥ OBJips(τstart) ≥ 1
κ2
ĝT ≥ 1
κ2
OPT
[T ]
LP −O(DEV(T )), (6.19)
where the second inequality uses Eq. (6.12) and the last inequality uses Eq. (6.10). Plugging Eq. (6.18) and
Eq. (6.19) back into Eq. (6.17) we get,
REW ≥ 1ratio min
(
OPT
[T ]
LP
12d ,
OPT
[T ]
LP
12
)
− reg(T )−O(DEV(T )). (6.20)
And from Eq. (5.4) we have OPT[T ]LP ≥ OPTFD. Plugging this into Eq. (6.20) we get Eq. (6.3).
6.1 Proof of Lemma 6.6 (last full phase offers sufficient rewards)
We first prove the following property of the optimal solution.
Claim 6.7. Let T1 < T2 be any two time-steps. Then,
OBJ([T1, T2]) ≥ OBJ(T2)− OBJ(T1 − 1). (6.21)
Proof. We prove this claim as follows. Let µT2 denote the optimal solution to LPMT2 ,B,T2
. Since ct,i(a) ≥
0 for every a ∈ [K], t ∈ [T ] and i ∈ [d] we have
µT2 ·
∑
t∈[T2] ct,i ≤ B =⇒ µT2 ·
∑
t∈[T1−1] ct,i ≤ B.
Thus µT2 is feasible to LPMT1−1,B,T1−1. This implies that
∑
t∈[T1−1]µT2 ·rt ≤ OBJ(T1−1). Likewise
µT2 is also feasible to LPM [T1,T2],B,[T1,T2]
.
Therefore we have,
OBJ([T1, T2]) ≥
∑T2
t=T1
µT2 · rt
=
∑
t∈[T2] µT2 · rt −
∑
t∈[T1−1]µT2 · rt
= OBJ(T2)−
∑
t∈[T1−1]µT2 · rt
≥ OBJ(T2)− OBJ(T1 − 1)
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Consider OBJ([τstart, τend]). From Eq. (6.21) we have
OBJ([τstart, τend]) ≥ OBJ(τend)− OBJ(τstart − 1). (6.22)
From Lemma 6.4 we can re-write Eq. (6.22) as
OBJ(τend)− OBJ(τstart − 1) ≥ OBJips(τend)− OBJips(τstart − 1)−O(DEV(T )). (6.23)
For some j ∈ dlogκ(T )e, at time-step τend the value ĝt exceeds κj for the first time. Likewise ĝt
exceeds κj−1 for the first time at τstart and is smaller than this value at τstart − 1. This implies that
OBJips(τend) ≥ κj and OBJips(τstart − 1) < κj−1. Therefore Eq. (6.23) simplifies to
OBJips(τend)− OBJips(τstart − 1)−O(DEV(T )) ≥ κj − κj−1 −O(DEV(T )). (6.24)
Combining Eq. (6.24), Eq. (6.23) and Eq. (6.22) we get
OBJ([τstart, τend]) ≥ κj − κj−1 −O(DEV(T )).
Dividing throughout by ĝT and noting that ĝT ≤ κj+1 we have,
OBJ([τstart,τend])
ĝT
≥ κj−1(κ−1)
κj+1
− O(DEV(T ))ĝT
=
(
1
κ − 1κ2
)− O(DEV(T ))ĝT
Finally applying Lemma 6.4 to ĝT we get Eq. (6.13). This completes the proof of Lemma 6.6.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 6.4 (IPS estimators are good)
Recall that for every t ∈ [T ] and a ∈ [K] we have that pt(a), the probability that arm a is chosen at time t
is at least γK . We now prove Lemma 6.8 which relates linear sums of rewards and consumptions computed
using the unbiased estimates and the true values. Denote Rγ,δ(τ) := Kγ
√
2τ ln(T/δ).
Claim 6.8. Let δ > 0, γ > 0 used by the EXP3.P(γ) be given parameters. Then we have the following
statements for any fixed z ∈ ∆K .
Pr
[
∃τ ∈ [T ]
∣∣∣∑t∈[τ ] z · [rˆt − rt]∣∣∣ > Rγ,δ(τ)] ≤ δ (6.25)
∀i ∈ [d] Pr
[
∃τ ∈ [T ]
∣∣∣∑t∈[τ ] z · [cˆt,i − ct,i(a)]∣∣∣ > Rγ,δ(τ)] ≤ δ (6.26)
Proof. The proof of this follows directly from the invocation of the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality. We will
show this for Equation (6.25). Define Yt := z · [rˆt − rt] (like-wise for the lower-tail use Yt := z · (rt− rˆt)).
Note that this forms a martingale difference sequence since E[z · (rˆt − rt) | Ht−1] = z · [rt − rt] = 0.
Here we used the fact that z is not random and fixed before the start of the algorithm. Also we have that
|Yt| ≤ Kγ . Using Lemma A.1 and taking a union bound over all τ ∈ [T ] we have the desired equation.
We will now prove the two inequalities in Eq. (6.10). We will first prove the first inequality in Eq. (6.10).
Let µ∗ denote the optimal solution to OPTLP
(
M τ , B
(
1− Rγ,δ(τ)B
)
, τ
)
. Note this is valid whenever
B > Ω
(
K
γ
√
τ log Tδ
)
. From Equation (6.26) we have that with probability at least 1− δ for every i ∈ [d],
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∑
t∈[τ ] µ
∗ · cˆt,i ≤
∑
t∈[τ ] µ
∗ · ct,i +Rγ,δ(τ).
≤ B (6.27)
Eq. (6.27) used the fact that
∑
t∈[τ ]µ
∗ · ct,i ≤ B (1−Rγ,δ(τ)).
Using Equation (6.25), we have that with probability at least 1− δ,∑
t∈[τ ] µ
∗ · rt ≤
∑
t∈[τ ] µ
∗ · rˆt +Rγ,δ(τ).
Using the fact that, ∑
t∈[τ ]µ
∗ · rt = OPTLP
(
M τ , B
(
1− Rγ,δ(τ)B
)
, τ
)
,
we have the following.
OPTLP
(
M τ , B
(
1− Rγ,δ(τ)B
)
, τ
)
−Rγ,δ(τ) ≤
∑
t∈[τ ] µ
∗ · rˆt. (6.28)
From Eq. (6.27) we have that µ∗ is feasible to OPTipsLP (τ) and from Eq. (6.28) this implies that
OBJips (τ) ≥ OPTLP
(
M τ , B
(
1− Rγ,δ(τ)B
)
, τ
)
−Rγ,δ(τ). (6.29)
Finally from Eq. (6.15) we have
OPTLP
(
M τ , B
(
1− Rγ,δ(τ)B
)
, τ
)
≥
(
1− Rγ,δ(τ)B
)
OBJ (τ) . (6.30)
From Eq. (6.29) and Eq. (6.30) we have
OBJips(τ) ≥ OBJ(τ)−Rγ,δ(τ)
(
1 +
OBJ(τ)
B
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=O
(
KOBJ(τ)
γB
√
τ log
T
δ
)
,
which gives the lower-tail in Eq. (6.10).
We will now prove the second inequality in Eq. (6.10) in a similar fashion. Let µ˜∗ denote the optimal
solution to OBJips
(
M τ , B
(
1− Rγ,δ(τ)B
)
, τ
)
.
From Equation (6.26) we have that with probability at least 1− δ for every i ∈ [d],
∑
t∈[τ ] µ˜
∗ · ct,i ≤
∑
t∈[τ ] µ˜
∗ · cˆt,i +Rγ,δ(τ).
≤ B (6.31)
Eq. (6.31) used the fact that
∑
t∈[τ ] µ˜
∗ · cˆt,i ≤ B (1−Rγ,δ(τ)).
Using Equation (6.25), we have that with probability at least 1− δ,∑
t∈[τ ] µ˜
∗ · rˆt ≤
∑
t∈[τ ] µ˜
∗ · rt +Rγ,δ(τ).
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From the fact that ∑
t∈[τ ] µ˜
∗ · rˆt = OPTipsLP
(
M τ , B
(
1− Rγ,δ(τ)B
)
, τ
)
,
we get the following.
OPTipsLP
(
M τ , B
(
1− Rγ,δ(τ)B
)
, τ
)
−Rγ,δ(τ) ≤
∑
t∈[τ ] µ˜
∗ · rt. (6.32)
From Eq. (6.31) we have that µ˜∗j is feasible to OPTLP (τ) and from Eq. (6.32) this implies that
OPTipsLP
(
M τ , B
(
1− Rγ,δ(τ)B
)
, τ
)
≤ OBJ (τ) +Rγ,δ(τ). (6.33)
Finally from Eq. (6.15) we have
OPTipsLP
(
M τ , B
(
1− Rγ,δ(τ)B
)
, τ
)
≥
(
1− Rγ,δ(τ)B
)
OBJips (τ) . (6.34)
Combining Eq. (6.34) and Eq. (6.33) we get,
OBJips(τ) ≤ OBJ(τ) + Rγ,δ(τ)
B −Rγ,δ(τ) (OBJ(τ) +Rγ,δ(τ)) . (6.35)
Since B0 > 2Rγ,δ(τ) we get,
OBJips(τ) ≤ OBJ(τ) + 2Rγ,δ(τ)
B
(OBJ(τ) +Rγ,δ(τ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=O
(
KOBJ(τ)
γB
√
τ log
T
δ
)
,
and thus we get the upper-tail in Eq. (6.10).
We will now prove Eq. (6.11). Recall that ĝτ := maxt∈[τ ] OBJips(t). Moreover OPT
[τ ]
LP = maxt∈[τ ] OBJ(t).
Consider ĝτ − OPT[τ ]LP. We have,
ĝτ − OPT[τ ]LP = max
t∈[τ ]
OBJips(t)− OPT[τ ]LP
≤ max
t∈[τ ]
(OBJ(t) + DEV(t))− OPT[τ ]LP
≤ max
t∈[τ ]
OBJ(t) + max
t∈[τ ]
DEV(t)− OPT[τ ]LP
= max
t∈[τ ]
DEV(t).
Now consider OPT[τ ]LP − ĝτ . We have,
OPT
[τ ]
LP − ĝτ ≤ OPT[τ ]LP −max
t∈[τ ]
(OBJ(t)− DEV(t))
≤ OPT[τ ]LP −max
t∈[τ ]
OBJ(t) + max
t∈[τ ]
DEV(t)
= max
t∈[τ ]
DEV(t).
This completes the proof of Lemma 6.4.
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7 Extensions
We obtain several extensions which highlight the modularity of LagrangeBwK: we apply Theorem 4.4 and
Theorem 5.1 with appropriately chosen primal algorithm ALG1, and immediately obtain strong performance
guarantees.13 We tackle four well-known scenarios:
• full feedback (e.g., Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994; Freund and Schapire, 1997; Arora et al., 2012):
in each round, the algorithm chooses an action and observes the outcomes of all possible actions; this
is a classic scenario in online machine learning.
• combinatorial semi-bandits (e.g., Gyo¨rgy et al., 2007; Kale et al., 2010; Audibert et al., 2011): actions
are feasible subsets of “atoms”. The atoms in the chosen action have individual outcomes that are
observed and add up to the action’s total outcome. Typical motivating example are subsets/lists of
news articles, ads, or web search results.
• contextual bandits with policy sets (e.g., Langford and Zhang, 2007; Dudı´k et al., 2011; Agarwal
et al., 2014): before each round, a context is observed, and the algorithm competes against the best
policy (mapping from context to actions) in a given policy class. In a typical application scenario, the
context includes known features of the current user.
• bandit convex optimization (starting from Kleinberg (2004); Flaxman et al. (2005), with recent ad-
vances Bubeck et al. (2015); Hazan and Levy (2014); Bubeck et al. (2017)). Here the set of actions is
a convex set X ⊂ RK . For each round t, the adversary chooses a concave function ft : X → [0, 1]
such that the reward for chosen action x ∈ X is ft(x).
Formalities. To simplify the statements, we make the following assumptions without further mention:
• The dual algorithm, ALG2, is always Hedge, with the associated regret bound from Eq. (3.4). For
high-probability regret bounds, δ = 1T is a fixed and known failure probability parameter.
• For Stochastic BwK, one resource is the dummy resource (with consumption BT for each arm). Algo-
rithm LagrangeBwK is run with parameters B0 = B and T0 = T .
• For Adversarial BwK, one of the arms is a null arm that has zero reward and zero resource consump-
tion. Algorithm 2 is run with any κ > 1 and range [gmin, gmax] = [
√
T , T ], as in Theorem 5.1(b).
A typical corollary. All our corollaries have the following shape, for some regret term reg:
(C1) In the stochastic version, algorithm LagrangeBwK achieves, with probability at least 1− 1T ,
OPTDP − REW ≤ O
(
T
B · reg
)
.
(C2) In the adversarial version, Algorithm 2 achieves
E[REW]
OPTFD
≥
1−O(reg)
(
1
OPTFD
+ 1dB
)
1
2 (d+ 1) ln(T )
.
Corollaries similar to (C2) can be achieved for Algorithm 3, too; we omit them for ease of exposition.
13For these theorems to hold, ALG1 needs to satisfy regret bound (3.2) only against adaptive adversaries that arise in the repeated
Lagrange game in the corresponding extension, not against arbitrary adaptive adversaries.
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7.1 BwK with full feedback
In the full-feedback version of BwK, the entire outcome matrix M t is revealed to the algorithm after each
round t. Accordingly, we can use Hedge as the primal algorithm ALG1. The effect is, essentially, that the
dependence on K, the number of arms, in the regret term becomes logarithmic rather than
√
K.
Corollary 7.1. Consider BwK with full feedback. Using Hedge as the primal algorithm, we obtain corol-
laries (C1) and (C2) with regret term reg =
√
T ln (dKT ).
Adversarial BwK with full feedback have not been studied before. For the stochastic version, the regret
bound is unsurprising: one expects to obtain a similar improvement with each of the three other algorithms in
the prior work on Stochastic BwK by tracing the “confidence terms” through the analysis. The significance
here is that we obtain this result as an immediate corollary.
7.2 Combinatorial Semi-Bandits with Knapsacks
Following Sankararaman and Slivkins (2018), we consider Combinatorial Semi-BwK, a common general-
ization of BwK and combinatorial semi-bandits (e.g., Gyo¨rgy et al., 2007; Kale et al., 2010; Audibert et al.,
2011). In this problem, actions correspond to subsets of some finite ground set Ω of size n, whose elements
are called atoms. There is a fixed family F ⊂ 2Ω of feasible actions. For each round t, there is an outcome
vector ot,e ∈ [0, 1n ]d+1 for each round atom e ∈ Ω, with the same semantics as the actions’ outcome vectors.
If an action S ⊂ Ω is chosen, the outcome vectors ot,e are observed for all atoms e ∈ S, and the action’s
outcome is the sumM t(S) =
∑
e∈S ot,e ∈ [0, 1]d. In the adversarial case, all outcome vectors ot,e, t ∈ [T ],
e ∈ Ω are chosen by an adversary arbitrarily before round 1. In the stochastic case, the atomic outcome
matrix (ot,e : e ∈ Ω) is drawn independently in each round t from some fixed distribution. Combinatorial
semi-bandits, as studied previously, is a special case with no resource constraints (d = 0).
Typical motivating examples involve ad/content personalization scenarios. Atoms can correspond to
items news articles, ads, or web search results, and actions are subsets that satisfy some constraints on
quantity, relevance, or diversity of items. One can also model ranked lists of atoms: then atoms are rank-
item pairs, and each feasible action S ⊂ Ω satisfies a constraint that each rank between 1 and |S| is present
in exactly one chosen rank-item pair.
A naive application of our main results suffers from regret terms that are proportional to
√|F|, which
may be exponential in the number of atoms n. Instead, the work on combinatorial semi-bandits features
regret bounds that scale polynomially in n. This is what we achieve, too. We use an algorithm from
Neu and Barto´k (2016) which solves combinatorial semi-bandits in the absence of resource constraints.
This algorithm satisfies a high-probability regret bound (3.2) against an adaptive adversary, with Rδ(T ) =
O(
√
nT log(1/δ)). 14
Corollary 7.2. Consider Combinatorial Semi-BwK with n atoms. Using the algorithm from Neu and Barto´k
(2016) as the primal algorithm, we obtain corollaries (C1) and (C2) with regret term reg =
√
nT log T .
The adversarial version of Combinatorial Semi-BwK has not been studied before.
The stochastic version has been studied in Sankararaman and Slivkins (2018) when the action set is a
matroid, achieving regret
O˜
(
OPTDP
√
n/B +
√
T/n+
√
OPTDP
)
.
14Prior work (Neu and Barto´k, 2016; Sankararaman and Slivkins, 2018) posits that atoms’ per-round rewards/consumptions lie
in the range [0, 1], rather than [0, 1
n
], so their stated regret bounds should be recaled accordingly.
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This regret bound becomes O˜(
√
nT ) in the regime when B and OPTDP are Ω(T ) (see Footnote 14). We
achieve the same regret bound for this regime, without the matroid assumption and without any extra work.
However, the regret bound in Sankararaman and Slivkins (2018) can be substantially better than ours when
OPTDP  T .
7.3 Contextual Bandits with Knapsacks
Following Badanidiyuru et al. (2014); Agrawal et al. (2016), we consider Contextual Bandits with Knapsacks
(cBwK), a common generalization of BwK and contextual bandits with policy sets (e.g., Langford and
Zhang, 2007; Dudı´k et al., 2011; Agarwal et al., 2014). The only change in the protocol, compared to BwK,
is that in the beginning of each round t a context xt ∈ X arrives and is observed by the algorithm before it
chooses an action. The context set X is arbitrary and known. In the adversarial version (Adversarial cBwK)
both xt and the outcome matrixM t is chosen by an adversary. In the stochastic version (Stochastic cBwK)
the pair (xt,M t) is chosen independently from some fixed but unknown distribution over such pairs.
In cBwK one is also given a finite set Π of policies: deterministic mappings from contexts to actions.15
Essentially, the algorithm competes with the best course of action restricted to these policies. For a formal
definition, let us interpret cBwK as a BwK problem with action set Π, denote this problem as BwK(Π). In
other words, actions in BwK(Π) are policies in cBwK. An algorithm for BwK(Π) is oblivious to context
arrivals. It chooses a policy pit ∈ Π in each round t, and receives an outcome for this policy: namely, the
outcome for action pi(xt). We are interested in the usual benchmarks for this problem, the best algorithm
OPTDP and the best fixed distribution OPTFD (where both benchmarks are constrained to use policies in Π);
denote them OPTDP(Π) and OPTFD(Π), respectively.
Without budget constraints (i.e., with B = T ), this is exactly contextual bandits with policy set Π. Both
benchmarks then reduce to the standard benchmark of the best fixed policy.
Background: algorithm EXP4.P. We use EXP4.P (Beygelzimer et al., 2011), an algorithm for the contex-
tual version of adversarial online learning with bandit feedback. The algorithm operates according to the
protocol in Figure 2.
Given: action set [K], context set X , policy set Π, payoff range [bmin, bmax].
In each round t ∈ [T ],
1. the adversary chooses a context xt ∈ X and a payoff vector gt ∈ [bmin, bmax]K ;
2. the algorithm chooses a distribution pt over Π (without seeing xt);
3. a policy pit ∈ Π is drawn independently from pt;
4. algorithm’s chosen action is defined as at = pit(xt) ∈ [K];
5. payoff gt(at) is received by the algorithm.
Figure 2: Adversarial contextual bandits
We are interested in regret bounds for EXP4.P relative to the best fixed policy:
OPTΠ = maxpi∈Π
∑
t∈[T ] ft(pi(xt)).
For each round t, the pair (xt, gt) induces a payoff vector f t ∈ [bmin, bmax]Π on policies:
ft(pi) = gt(pi(xt)) ∀pi ∈ Π.
15W.l.o.g. assume that Π contains all constant policies, i.e., all policies that always evaluate to the same action.
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Theorem 7.3 (Beygelzimer et al. (2011)). Fix failure probability δ > 0, policy set Π, and payoff range
[bmin, bmax]. Then algorithm EXP4.P (appropriately tuned) satisfies the following regret bound:
Pr
[
OPTΠ −
∑
t∈[T ] ft(pit) ≤ (bmax − bmin)Rδ(T )
]
≥ 1− δ, (7.1)
with regret term Rδ(T ) = O
(√
τK log(KT |Π|/δ)
)
.
Our solution for cBwK. We solve cBwK by reducing it to BwK(Π), and treating it as a BwK problem.
A naive solution simply posits |Π| arms and directly applies the machinery developed earlier in this paper.
This results in
√|Π| dependence in regret bounds, which is unsatisfactory, as the policy set may be very
large. Instead, we use EXP4.P as the primal algorithm (ALG1). We interpret EXP4.P as an algorithm for
(non-contextual) adversarial online learning, as defined in Section 3, with action set Π. It is easy to see that
Theorem 7.3 provides regret bound (3.2) under this interpretation. Therefore, we obtain the following:
Corollary 7.4. Consider contextual bandits with knapsacks, with policy set Π. Using EXP4.P as the pri-
mal algorithm, we obtain corollaries (C1) and (C2) with regret term reg =
√
TK ln (dKT |Π|). The
benchmarks are OPTDP = OPTDP(Π) and OPTFD = OPTFD(Π).
Adversarial cBwK has not been studied before. The regret bound for the adversarial case is meaningful
only if B >
√
T . This is essentially inevitable in light of the lower bound in Theorem 8.3.
Stochastic cBwK has been studied in Badanidiyuru et al. (2014); Agrawal et al. (2016), achieving regret
bound
O(reg)(1 + OPTDP(Π)/B), (7.2)
where the reg term is the same as in Corollary 7.4. Whereas the regret bound from Corollary 7.4 is
O(reg · T/B). Note that we match (7.2) in the regime OPTDP(Π) > Ω(T ). Our regret bound is optimal,
up to logarithmic factors, in the regime B > Ω(T ). This is due to the min
(
T, Ω(
√
KT log(|Π|)/ log(K)
)
lower bound on regret, which holds for contextual bandits (Agarwal et al., 2012).
Discussion. Our algorithms are slow, as the per-round running time of EXP4.P is proportional to |Π|. The
state-of-art approach to computational efficiency in contextual bandits is oracle-efficient algorithms, which
make only a small number of calls to an oracle that finds the best policy in Π for a given data set. In particular,
prior work for Stochastic cBwK (Agrawal et al., 2016) obtains an oracle-efficient algorithm with regret
bound as in (7.2). To obtain oracle-efficient algorithms for cBwK in our framework, both for the stochastic
and adversarial versions, it suffices to replace EXP4.P with an oracle-efficient algorithm for adversarial
contextual bandits that obtains regret bound (7.1), possibly with a larger regret term Rδ. Such algorithms
almost exist: a recent breakthrough (Syrgkanis et al., 2016a; Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2016; Syrgkanis et al.,
2016b) obtains algorithms with similar regret bounds, but only for expected regret.
7.4 Bandit Convex Optimization with Knapsacks
We consider Bandit Convex Optimization with Knapsacks (BCOwK), a common generalization of BwK
and bandit convex optimization. We define BCOwK as a version of BwK, where the action set X is a
convex subset of RK . For each round t, there is a concave function ft : X → [0, 1] and convex functions
gt,i : X → [0, 1], for each resource i, so that the reward for choosing action x ∈ X in this round is ft(x) and
consumption of each resource i is gt,i(x). In the stochastic version, the tuple of functions (ft; gt,1 , . . . , gt,d)
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is sampled independently in each round t from some fixed distribution (which is not known to the algorithm).
In the adversarial version, all these tuples are chosen by an adversary before the first round.
Neither stochastic nor adversarial version of BCOwK have been studied in prior work (but see the
discussion of constrained online convex optimization in Section 2). Bandit convex optimization, as studied
previously, is a special case with no resource constraints (d = 0).
The primal algorithm ALG1 in LagrangeBwK faces an instance of BCO (with an adaptive adversary).
This is because the Lagrange function (4.3) is a concave function of the action, as sum of concave functions.
For our primal algorithm, we use a recent breakthrough on BCO due to Bubeck et al. (2017). This algorithm
satisfies the high-probability regret bound (3.2) against an adaptive adversary, with regret term
Rδ(T ) = O(K
9.5 log7(T )
√
T log(1/δ)).
We assume the existence of a null arm: a point x ∈ X such that ft(x) = gt,i(x) = 0 for each resource
i except the “dummy resource”. (Recall that we posit the “dummy resource” – a resource whose consump-
tion is B/T for each arm – for the stochastic version.) Unlike elsewhere in this paper, this assumption is
not without loss of generality: indeed, the null arm should be “embedded” into X without breaking the
convexity/concavity properties. Moreover, we assume that the null arm lies in the interior of X .
Corollary 7.5. Consider BCOwK for a given convex set X ⊂ RK . Using the algorithm from Bubeck et al.
(2017) as the primal algorithm, we obtain corollaries (C1) and (C2) with regret term reg = K9.5 log7.5(T )
√
T .
Remark 7.6. LagrangeBwK framework extends to infinite action sets: everything carries over, as long
as Eq. (4.4) holds. (Essentially, we never take union bounds over actions, and we can replace max and
sums over actions with sup and integrals.) For BCOwK, Eq. (4.4) is a statement about constrained convex
optimization programs. According to Slater’s condition (see Eq. (5.27) in Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004), it
suffices to have a point x in the interior of X such that gt,i(x) < B/T for each resource i ∈ [d] other than
the dummy resource (or any other resource whose consumption is the same in all rounds). One such point
is the null arm.
8 Lower bounds
We prove the lower bounds on the competitive ratio that we have claimed in Section 1: the Ω(log T ) lower
bound w.r.t. the best fixed distribution benchmark (OPTFD), the Ω(T ) lower bound w.r.t. the best dynamic
policy benchmark (OPTDP), and the Ω(K) lower bound w.r.t. the best fixed arm benchmark (OPTFA). As a
warm-up, we analyze the simple example from Section 1 that leads to the 54 lower bound w.r.t. OPTFD. All
lower-bounds are for a randomized algorithm against an oblivious adversary. We summarize all these lower
bounds in the following theorem:
Theorem 8.1. Consider Adversarial BwK with a single resource (d = 1), K arms, budget B, and time
horizon T . Consider any randomized algorithm for this problem, and let REW denote its reward. Then:
(a) OPTFD/E[REW] ≥ 54 − o(1) for some problem instance (from the example in the Introduction).
This holds even if OPTFD ≥ T/4 and B = T/2.
(b) OPTFD/E[REW] ≥ Ω(log T ) for some problem instance.
This holds for any given budget B ∈ [c0 log3(T ), O(T 1−α)], even if OPTFD ≥ B2/T .
Here α ∈ (0, 1) is an arbitrary absolute constant, and c0 is any large enough absolute constant.
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(c) OPTDP/E[REW] ≥ T/B2 for some problem instance.
This holds for any given budget B <
√
T , with OPTFD = B.
(d) OPTFA/E[REW] ≥ Ω(K) for some problem instance.
This holds for any given budget B, with OPTFA > B/KK .
Remark 8.2. The lower bounds for parts (a,b,c) hold (even) for problem instances with K = 2 arms, one
of which is the “null arm” with no rewards and no resource consumption. The lower bounds in parts (a,b)
hold even for a much more permissive feedback model from the online packing literature, namely, when
the algorithm observes the outcome vector for all actions in a given round, and moreover does it before it
chooses an arm in this round.
We tweak our construction from Theorem 8.1(c) to obtain a strong lower bound for the contextual
version of Adversarial BwK (a.k.a. Adversarial cBwK), as studied in Section 7.3. This lower bound implies
that Adversarial cBwK is essentially hopeless in the regime B <
√
T , complementing a strong positive
result (Corollary 7.4) for the regime B > Ω˜(
√
T ). It is proved in Section 8.3, along with Theorem 8.1(c).
Theorem 8.3. Consider adversarial contextual bandits with knapsacks (Adversarial cBwK), with policy
class Π, a single resource (d = 1), K = 2 arms, and any given budget B <
√
T . Consider any randomized
algorithm for this problem, and let REW denote its reward. Then
OPTFD(Π)/E[REW] ≥ T/B2 for some problem instance.
Notation. In the proof of lower-bounds below, we use the following notation. Given an instance I, we
denote OPTFD(I), OPTFA(I) and OPTDP(I) to denote the optimal value of the best fixed distribution, best
fixed arm and best dynamic policy respectively, for instance I. Likewise let OPT[T ]LP (I) denote the optimal
LP value for instance I and given an algorithm A and an instance I, let E[REW(A, I)] denote the expected
reward obtained byA on instance I, where the expectation is over the internal randomness of the algorithm.
8.1 Warm-up: example from the Introduction
As a warm-up, let us recap and analyze the example from the Introduction.
Construction 8.4. There are two arms and one resource with budget B = T2 . Arm 1 has zero rewards and
zero consumption. Arm 2 has consumption 1 in each round, and offers reward 12 in each round of the first
half-time (T2 rounds). In the second half-time, arm 2 offers either reward 1 in all rounds, or reward 0 in
all rounds. More formally, there are two problem instances, call them I1 and I2, that coincide for the first
half-time and differ in the second half-time.
Lemma 8.5. Any algorithm suffers OPTFD/E[REW] ≥ 54 − o(1) on some instances in Construction 8.4.
The intuition is that given a random instance as input the algorithm needs to choose how much budget
to invest in the first half-time, without knowing what comes in the second, and any choice (in expectation)
leads to the claimed competitive ratio.
To prove Lemma 8.5 (as well we the main lower bound in Theorem 8.1(b)) we compare algorithm’s
performance to OPT[T ]LP , and invoke the following lemma:
Lemma 8.6. OPTFD ≥ OPT[T ]LP −O
(
OPT
[T ]
LP ·
√
log dT
B
)
.
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Proof. Let τ∗ denote the time-step at which OPT[T ]LP is maximized. Let p denote the optimal solution to
τ∗ ·OPTLP(M τ∗ , B(1−), τ∗) where  =
√
log dT
B . Note that OPTFD is at least as large as the expected total
reward obtained by the distribution p. From the Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds (Lemma A.2), with probability
at least 1− dT−2 we have
∀i ∈ [d] ∑t∈[τ∗] p · ct,i ≤ B.
Conditioning on this event the expected total reward obtained by p is∑
t∈[τ∗] p · rt = τ∗ · OPTLP(M τ∗ , B(1− ), τ∗).
Thus the expected total reward obtained by p is at least τ∗ · OPTLP(M τ∗ , B(1− ), τ∗). 16 Moreover from
Eq. (6.15) we have that
OPTFD ≥ τ∗ · OPTLP(M τ∗ , B(1− ), τ∗)
≥ (1− )τ∗ · OPTLP(M τ∗ , B(1− ), τ∗)
≥ OPT[T ]LP −O
(
OPT
[T ]
LP
√
log dT
B
)
.
Proof of Lemma 8.5. Denote the two arms by A1 and A0 where A0 denotes the null arm. The consumption
for arm A1 is 1 for all rounds in both I1 and I2. Thus the only difference between the two instances is the
rewards obtained for playing arm A1 in each round. The instances have two phases where each phase lasts
for T2 rounds. In phase 1, in both I1 and I2 playing arm A1 fetches a reward 12 . In the second phase, in I1,
the reward for playing arm A1 is 0 while in I2 the reward for playing arm A1 is 1. Thus the outcome matrix
for the first T2 time-steps is the same in instances I1 and I2.
Consider a randomized algorithm A. Let α1 be the expected number of times arm A1 is played by A in
the first T2 rounds on instances I1 and I2. Note since the outcome matrix is same, the expected number of
times the arm is played should be same in both the instances. Let α2,1, α2,2 denote the expected number of
times arm A1 is played in the second phase in instances I1 and I2 respectively.
Recall that in this section we are interested in a lower-bound on the competitive ratio OPTFD/E[REW]
for every instance. Consider OPT[T ]LP (I1), the optimal value of the best fixed distribution on I1. Using
Eq. (5.4) with τ = T2 this equals
T
2 · OPTLP
(
M T
2
, B, T2
)
which evaluates to T4 . Likewise OPT
[T ]
LP (I2)
equals T · OPTLP
(
MT , B, T
)
, which evaluates to 3T8 . Consider the performance of A on I1. We have,
OPT
[T ]
LP (I1)
E[REW(A,I1)] ≥
(
T
4
)
/
(
α1
2
)
. (8.1)
Likewise on I2 we have,
OPT
[T ]
LP (I2)
E[REW(A,I2)] ≥
(
3T
8
)
/
(
α1
2 + α2,2
)
. (8.2)
Thus the competitive ratio ofA is at least the maximum of the ratios in Eq. (8.1) and Eq. (8.2). Thus we
want to minimize this maximum and is achieved when the two ratios are equal to each other.
Notice that the term α2,1 does not appear in Eq. (8.1) and Eq. (8.2). By setting the term in Eq. (8.1)
equal to the term in Eq. (8.2) and re-arranging,
α1 = 4α2,2. (8.3)
16With probability T−2 we assume that p has an expected reward of 0.
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Moreover we have α1 + α2,2 ≤ B. Combining this with Eq. (8.3) we get α1 ≤ 4B5 = 2T5 and the
corresponding competitive ratio is at least
(
T
4
)
/
(
α1
2
) ≥ 54 . By Lemma 8.6 with d = 1, for every j ∈ [2],
OPTFD(Ij)/E[REW(A, Ij)] ≥ 54 −O
(
OPT
[T ]
LP
T
√
log T
B
)
.
8.2 The main lower bound: proof of Theorem 8.1(b)
To obtain the Ω(log T ) lower bound in Theorem 8.1(b), we extend Construction 8.4 to one with Ω(log T )
phases rather than just two. As before, the algorithm needs to decide how much budget to save for the
subsequent phases; without knowing whether they would bring higher rewards or nothing. The construction
is as follows, see Figure 3 for a pictorial representation:
Construction 8.7. There is one resource with budget B, and two arms, denoted A0, A1. Arm A0 is the
“null arm” that has zero reward and zero consumption. The consumption of arm A1 is 1 in all rounds. The
rewards ofA1 are defined as follows. We partition the time into TB phases of durationB each (for simplicity,
assume that B divides T ). We consider TB problem instances; for each instance Iτ , τ ∈
[
T
B
]
arm A1 has
positive rewards up to and including phase τ ; after that all rewards are 0. In each phase σ ∈ [τ ], arm A1
has reward σB/T in each round.
Time, in TB phases of B rounds each
1 τ τ + 1
ϵ 2ϵ τϵ 0
00
. . . . . .
. . .. . .0 0
Consumption=1
Consumption=0Null Arm
Arm 1
Figure 3: The lower-bounding construction for the Ω(log T ) lower bound. Here  = BT .
The lower bound holds for a wide range of budgets B, as expressed by the following lemma:
Lemma 8.8. For any budget B and any algorithm there is a problem instance in Construction 8.7 such that
OPTFD
E[REW]
≥ 1
2
· ln(bT/Bc) + ζ −O
(
log1.5 T√
B
)
, (8.4)
where ζ = 0.577... is the Euler-Masceroni constant, and OPTFD ≥ B2/T .
In the rest of this subsection we prove Lemma 8.8. Fix any randomized algorithm A. As before in this
sub-section we are interested in the ratio OPTFD/E[REW(A)]. We argue that it has the claimed competitive
ratio on at least one instance Iτ in the construction 8.7. The proof proceeds in two parts. We first argue
about the solution structure of the optimal distribution for the construction 8.7 (we prove this formally in
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Lemma 8.9). Next we characterize the expected number of times arm A1 is played if A optimal algorithm
in each of the phases. Combining the two we get Lemma 8.8.
Structure of the optimal solution. Define OPTLP(M τ∗ , B, τ∗) to be the optimal value of LP 4.1 on the
instance Iτ . Then we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 8.9. For a given instance Iτ we have OPTLP(M τ∗ , B, τ∗) = B(τ+1)2 .
Proof. Let P(t) denote the non-zero reward on arm A1 at time-step t (i.e., P(t) = d tB e). It suffices to
prove that the optimal stopping time τ∗ = Bτ . Indeed, given that the stopping time is Bτ , the optimal
solution is to set X(1) = 1τ and X(0) = 1− 1τ thus obtaining a total reward of 1τ
∑
t∈[Bτ ] P(t). From the
definition of P(t) we have that 1τ
∑
t∈[Bτ ] P(t) = 1τ
∑
j∈[τ ] Bj. Using the fact that
∑
j∈[τ ] j =
τ(τ+1)
2
we get the statement of the Lemma. Thus it remains to prove that the optimal stopping time τ∗ = Bτ .
First it is easy to prove that τ∗ ≤ Bτ . Since there are no rewards after time-step τ∗, we have
∀t′ > 0 OPTLP(M τ∗+t′ , B, τ∗ + t′) = 1τ+t′
∑
t∈[τ∗] P(t) < 1τ
∑
t∈[Bτ ] P(t).
Now we will argue that the optimal stopping time cannot be strictly lesser than τ∗. To do so, first we
argue that for two stopping times t1 < t2 within the same phase, the maximum objective is achieved for the
stopping time t2. This implies that the optimal stopping time has to be the last time step of some phase.
Consider times t1 < t2 such that P(t1) = P(t2) = τ . Then we want to claim that
B
t1
(∑
t∈[t1] P(t)
)
≤ Bt2
(∑
t∈[t2] P(t)
)
.
For contradiction assume the inequality does not hold. Then we have the following.∑
t∈[t1] P(t) > t1t2
(∑
t∈[t2] P(t)
)
.
Note that
∑
t∈[B(τ−1)] P(t) =
∑
t′∈[τ ]Bt
′ = B(τ−1)τ2 . Thus we have∑
t∈[t1] P(t) =
B(τ−1)τ
2 + (t1 −B(τ − 1))τ,∑
t∈[t2] P(t) =
B(τ−1)τ
2 + (t2 −B(τ − 1))τ.
Therefore we have,
B(τ−1)τ
2 + (t1 −B(τ − 1))τ > t1B(τ−1)τ2t2 + (t2 −B(τ − 1))τ.
Further re-arranging, B(τ−1)2 > t2. This is a contradiction since t2 is in phase τ , so t2 ≥ B(τ − 1).
Next we argue that the optimal value is achieved when the stopping time is in the last non-zero rewards
phase. Consider two phases τ1 < τ2. Thus the ending times are Bτ1 and Bτ2. To prove that the optimal
value increases by stopping at Bτ2, as opposed to Bτ1, we want to show that
1
τ1
∑
t∈[τ1]Bt ≤ 1τ2
∑
t∈[τ2]Bt.
As before assume for a contradiction that this doesn’t hold. Then re-arranging we get, τ1(τ1+1)2 >
τ1(τ2+1)
2 , which implies τ1 > τ2, contradiction. We conclude that the stopping time is τ
∗ = Bτ .
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Expected behavior of the optimal algorithm. Consider any randomized algorithmA. The performance of
A is then as follows. From the definition of OPT[T ]LP we have,
OPT
[T ]
LP
E[REW(A)] = max1≤τ≤T/B
Bτ · OPTLP(MBτ , B,Bτ)
E[REW(A)] . (8.5)
We will now show that for any algorithm A, there exists an instance j ∈ [ TB ],
OPT
[T ]
LP (Ij)
E[REW(A, Ij)] ≥ Ω(log T ). (8.6)
Consider two consecutive instances Iτ and Iτ+1. The outcome matrices in the phases 1, 2 , . . . , τ look
identical in both these instances. This implies that any randomized algorithm cannot distinguish the two
instances (in expectation). Thus, the expected number of times arm A1 is chosen by algorithm A in phases
1, 2 , . . . , τ is identical. Let ατ denote the expected number of times A plays arm A1 in phase τ . Note that
this is the same for all instances Iτ , Iτ+1, , . . . , IT/B , as just argued. Thus, we can write
E[REW(A, Iτ )] =
∑
j∈[τ ]
jαj . (8.7)
Note that the expected number of times armA1 is played in phase τ on instances I1, I2 , . . . , Iτ−1 does
not appear in this expression and thus, is irrelevant for our purposes. Additionally, WLOG we only consider
algorithms that exhaust its budgetB. Indeed, an algorithm can instead choose only armA1 when the number
of steps remaining equals its residual budget, without any degradation in the total reward. Combining
Eq. (8.7) with Lemma 8.9, the LHS in Eq. (8.5) can be lower-bounded by,
OPT
[T ]
LP
E[REW(A)] ≥
B
2
·
 min
α≥0:
〈α,1〉=B
max
1≤τ≤T/B
τ + 1∑
j∈[τ ] jαj
 . (8.8)
We can characterize the optimal solution α in Eq. (8.8) as follows. Since the objective is a minimum
over TB convex functions with a single equality constraint on the sum of the variables, from complementary
slackness condition the minimum is attained when
for each τ ∈ [T/B], the expression
(∑
j∈[τ ] jαj
)
· 1τ+1 is the same . (8.9)
We will now prove that Eq. (8.9) leads to the following recurrence for the maximizing values of αj .
∀j ≥ 2 αj = α1
2j
. (8.10)
We will prove the recurrence Eq. (8.10) via induction. The base case is when j = 2. By Eq. (8.9),
1
α1
=
3/2
α1 + 2α2
,
which implies that α2 = 14α1, and we are done. Now consider the inductive case; let all α up to ατ satisfy
the recurrence Eq. (8.10). Consider the instance Iτ and Iτ+1. From Eq. (8.9) we have,
α1 +
∑τ
j=2 α1/2
τ + 1
=
α1 +
∑τ
j=2 α1/2 + (τ + 1)ατ+1
τ + 2
.
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Rearranging, ατ+1 = 12(τ+1)α1. This completes the inductive step, and the proof of Eq. (8.10).
We complete the proof of the lemma as follows. As argued in Eq. (8.10), for the minimum value
of {αj}j∈[T/B], the expression B2 · τ+1∑j∈[τ ] jαj , which is the RHS in Eq. (8.8), is the same for all τ and in
particular for τ = 1. Substituting τ = 1, this evaluates toB/α1. Since α1(1+1/4+1/6+. . .+B/2T ) ≤ B
it follows that α1 ≤ 2B/H( TB ), where H(n) denotes the nth Harmonic number. So, the right-hand side
of Eq. (8.5) is at least 12H(
T
B ). Finally, H(n) ≥ ln(n) + ζ, where ζ = 0.577... is the Euler-Masceroni
constant. Combining this with Lemma 8.6 we obtain Eq. (8.4).
8.3 Best dynamic policy: proof of Theorem 8.1(c) and Theorem 8.3
Consider the following construction of the lower-bound example.
Construction 8.10. There is one resource with budget B, and two arms, denoted A0, A1. Arm A0 is the
‘null arm’ that has zero reward and zero consumption. The consumption of arm A1 is 1 in all rounds. The
rewards ofA1 are defined as follows. We partition the time into TB phases of durationB each (for simplicity,
assume that B divides T ). We consider TB problem instances; for each instance Iτ , τ ∈ [T/B] arm A1 has
0 reward in all phases except phase τ ; in phase τ it has a reward of 1 in each round.
Lemma 8.11. Consider Construction 8.10 with any given time horizon T ≥ 2 and budget B ≤ √T . Let
ALG be an arbitrary randomized algorithm for BwK. Then for one of the problem instances,
OPTDP/E[REW] ≥ T/B2. (8.11)
Proof. Let n = TB be the number of phases in Construction 8.10. Let ALG be a deterministic algorithm. Let
REW denote its total reward, and let Eτ [·] denote the expectation over the uniform-at-random choice of the
problem instance Iτ . We claim that
OPTDP/Eτ [REW] ≥ T/B2. (8.12)
Assume that ALG maximizes Eτ [REW] (over deterministic algorithms). Then it satisfies the following:
• Within each phase, if ALG ever chooses to play arm A1, it does so in the first round of the phase. If it
receives a reward of 1 in this round, it plays A1 for the rest of the phase. Else, it never plays A1 for
the rest of this phase.
For each τ ∈ [n], let ατ denote the number of times ALG chooses arm A1 in phase τ in problem
instance Iτ . The expected reward of ALG over the uniform-at-random choice of the problem instance Iτ is
E[REW] = 1n
∑
i∈[n] αi. Let (αpi(1), αpi(2) , . . . , αpi(k)) be the subsequence of (α1 , . . . , αn) which contains
all elements with non-zero values.
The key observation is as follows. The problem instances Ipi(τ−1) and Ipi(τ) are identical until phase
pi(τ − 1)− 1. Since the feedback received by ALG until the first time it chooses arm A1 in phase pi(τ − 1)
is identical, it follows that αpi(τ−1) − αpi(τ) = 1. Therefore,∑
i∈[n] αi =
∑
i∈[k] αpi(i) = k · αpi(1) − k(k−1)2 .
Noting that α1 ≤ B and k ≤ min(B,n) = B , we have:
E[REW] ≤ 1n
∑
i∈[n] αi < B
2/n = B3/T.
Since OPTDP = B for every problem instance Iτ , Eq. (8.12) holds for ALG, and therefore for any other
deterministic algorithm. By Yao’s lemma, for every randomized algorithm ALG there exists a problem
instance Iτ such that (8.11) holds.
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We now use the same construction to prove Theorem 8.3.
Proof sketch of Theorem 8.3. We prove the Theorem by contradiction. Let B ≤ √T . For contradiction,
consider an algorithm ALG for cBwK on a policy set Π such that OPTFD(Π)/E[REW(ALG)] < T/B2. We
will now use ALG to construct an algorithm A for the Construction 8.10 such that OPTDP/E[REW(A)] <
T/B2 for every instance. This contradicts Lemma 8.11.
Consider a policy set Π with |n| policies. Every policy pi ∈ Π maps contexts in the range [1, T ] to the
action set {A1, A0}. In particular, a policy piτ ∈ Π maps contexts that lie in the range [B ∗(τ−1)+1, B ∗τ ]
to arm A1 and all other contexts to A0. A invokes ALG as a sub-routine with the policy set Π. At each time-
step t, A gives the context xt = t to ALG and plays the arm chosen by ALG.
For an instance Iτ in Construction 8.10, OPTFD(Π) is the total reward obtained by choosing the ac-
tion given by piτ in all time-steps. The total reward obtained is B, which equals OPTDP(Iτ ). Therefore,
OPTFD(Π)/E[REW(ALG)] < T/B2 implies we have OPTDP/E[REW(A)] < T/B2 for every instance Iτ ,
which is a contradiction.
8.4 Best fixed arm: proof of Theorem 8.1(d)
We use the following construction for the lower-bound.
Construction 8.12. There is one resource with budget B, and K arms denoted by A1, A2 , . . . , AK . Arm
AK is the ‘null arm’ that has zero reward and zero consumption. There areK instances in the family. In each
instance, the time-steps are divided into T/K equally spaced phases. In instance Ij , all arms Aj′ where
j′ > j have 0 reward and 0 consumption in all time-steps. Consider an instance Ij for some j ∈ [K − 1]
and an arm j′ ≤ j. Arm Aj′ has a reward of 1KK−j′ and consumption of 1 in all time-steps in phase j′ and
has a reward of 0 and consumption of 0 in every other time-step. Thus the rewards and consumption are
bounded in the interval [0, 1] for every arm and every time-step in all instances in this family.
Lemma 8.13. Let T ≥ 2, 2 ≤ B ≤ T , K ≥ 3 be given parameters of the AdversarialBwK problem.
We show that there exists a family of instances with d = 1 shared resource such that for every randomized
algorithm A we have OPTFAE[REW(A)] is at least Ω(K) on one of these instances.
Proof. First note that the best fixed arm in instance Ij is to pick arm Aj which yields a total reward of
B
KK−j .
Consider a randomized algorithm A. Observe that in the first j phases, the instances Ij−1 and Ij
have identical outcome matrices. Thus the expected number of times any arm Ak for k ∈ [K] is chosen
in phases {1, 2 , . . . , j} should be the same in both the instances. Let αk denote the expected number
of times arm k is played by A in phase k on instances Ik, Ik+1 , . . . , IK−1 17. Moreover we have that
α1 + α2 , . . . , αK−1 ≤ B.
To show the lower-bound we want to minimize the competitive ratio on every instance for all possible
values of α1, α2 , . . . , αK−1. For ease of notation denote rj := 1KK−j . Let αB denote the set of values to{αk}k∈[K−1] such that
∑
k∈[K−1] αk ≤ B. Thus,
OPTFA
E[REW(A)] ≥ minαB rkB∑j∈[k] rjαj . (8.13)
The ratio is minimized when all ratios in Eq. (8.13) are equal. We will show via induction that this yields
the following recurrence,
∀k ≥ 2 αk =
(
1− rk−1rk
)
α1. (8.14)
17This has to be the same in all instances since the outcome matrix is identical until phase k in all these instances
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Combining this with the condition that
∑
k∈[K−1] αk ≤ B, this yields the condition α1 ≤ B
K− 1K
.
Moreover the minimizing value in Eq. (8.13) is K − 1K which proves Lemma 8.13.
We will now prove the recurrence Eq. (8.14). Consider the base case with k = 2. Equalizing the first
two terms in Eq. (8.13) we get
r1B
r1α1
= r2Br1α1+r2α2 .
Re-arranging we obtain that α2 =
(
1− r1r2
)
α1. We will now prove the inductive case. Let the recur-
rence be true for all 1 ≤ k ≤ k′. Consider the case k = k′ + 1. Setting the k′ and k′ + 1 ratios in Eq. (8.13)
equal, we obtain
rk′B∑
j∈[k′] rjαj
=
rk′+1B∑
j∈[k′+1] rjαj
. (8.15)
Moreover from the inductive hypothesis we have αj =
(
1− rj−1rj
)
α1 for every j ≤ k′. Thus we have∑
j∈[k′] rjαj = rk′α1∑
j∈[k′+1] rjαj = rk′α1 + rk′+1αk′+1.
Plugging this back in Eq. (8.15) we get
rk′B
rk′α1
=
rk′+1B
rk′α1+rk′+1αk′+1
.
Rearranging we get αk′+1 =
(
1− r′krk′+1
)
α1. This completes the induction.
9 Open Questions
We use essentially the same algorithm, LagrangeBwK, to solve both stochastic and adversarial version of
bandits with knapsacks. Yet, we use it with different parameter T0 and a slightly different definition of the
outcome matrices. Indeed, recall that in the stochastic setting there a ‘dummy resource’ with strictly positive
consumption for all arms, whereas in the adversarial version the null arm must have zero consumption for
all resources. Can we solve both versions with exactly the same algorithm? One concrete goal would be to
achieve O(log T ) competitive ratio in the adversarial version, and o(T ) regret for the stochastic version in
the regime min(B,OPTFD) ≥ Ω(T ). A similar “best of both worlds” result has been obtained for bandits
without budget/supply constraints: one algorithm that achieves optimal regret rates for both adversarial
bandits and stochastic bandits, without knowing which environment it is in (Bubeck and Slivkins, 2012;
Seldin and Slivkins, 2014; Auer and Chiang, 2016). Further developments focused on mostly stochastic
environments with a small amount of adversarial behavior (Seldin and Slivkins, 2014; Seldin and Lugosi,
2017; Lykouris et al., 2018; Wei and Luo, 2018); similar questions are relevant to BwK as well, once the
basic “best-of-both-worlds” question is resolved.
Given our upper and lower bounds, the competitive ratio OPTFD−regE[REW] can potentially be improved in
several regimes. Some concrete open questions are as follows:
• obtain constant competitive ratio in the regime B = Ω(T ).
• obtain sublinear dependence of the competitive ratio on d, the number of resources.
• obtain constant competitive ratio for problem instances with “large enough” OPTFD.
40
• obtain optimal constant competitive ratio when OPTFD is known up to a constant factor.
• obtain competitive ratio in Theorem 5.1 uniformly over gmin (i.e., for all gmin simultaneously). Equiv-
alently, obtain competitive ratio O(ln(T/OPTFD)).
Given the importance of online learning in repeated stochastic zero-sum games, online learning in re-
peated adversarial zero-sum games is of independent interest. While we made use of it in the context of
Adversarial BwK, it is tantalizing to study it in more general contexts, and use it in a fruitful way in other
problems. After the initial publication of this paper on arxiv.org, Cardoso et al. (2019) obtained a
powerful result in this direction, as discussed in Section 2.1.
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A Standard tools
Our exposition in the body of the paper relies on some tools that are either known or can easily be derived
using standard techniques. We state (and sometimes derive) these tools in this appendix.
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A.1 Concentration Inequalities
Lemma A.1 (Azuma-Hoeffding inequality Motwani and Raghavan (1995)). Let Y1, Y2, . . . , YT be a mar-
tingale difference sequence (i.e., E[Yt | Y1, Y2 , . . . , Yt−1] = 0). Suppose |Yt| ≤ c for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}.
Let R0,δ(T ) :=
√
2Tc2 ln(1/δ). Then for every δ > 0,
Pr
[∑
t∈[T ] Yt > R0,δ(T )
]
≤ δ.
Lemma A.2 (Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds Motwani and Raghavan (1995)). Let X1, X2, . . . , XT be a se-
quence of independent random variables such that |Xt| ≤ c for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}. Let Zt := E[Xt].
Then for every δ > 0,
Pr
[∣∣∣∑t∈[T ]Xt − Zt∣∣∣ > 3√(∑t∈[T ] Zt) c2 ln(1/δ)] ≤ δ.
A.2 Lagrangians: proof of Lemma 4.2
Assume one of the resources is the dummy resource, and one of the arms is the null arm. Consider the linear
program LPM ,B,T , for some outcome matrixM . Let L = LM ,B,T denote the Lagrange function.
Lemma A.3 (Lemma 4.2, restated). Suppose (X∗,λ∗) is a mixed Nash equilibrium for the Lagrangian
game. Then X∗ is an optimal solution for the linear program (4.1). Moreover, the minimax value of the
Lagrangian game equals the LP value: L(X∗,λ∗) = OPTLP.
In what follows we prove Lemma A.3. Writing out the definition of the mixed Nash equilibrium,
L(X∗,λ) ≥ L(X∗,λ∗) ≥ L(X,λ∗) ∀X ∈ ∆K ,λ ∈ ∆d. (A.1)
For brevity, denote r(X∗) =
∑
a∈[K]X
∗(a) r(a) and ci(X∗) =
∑
a∈[K]X
∗(a) ci(a).
We first state and prove the complementary slackness condition for the Nash equilibrium.
Claim A.4. For every resource i ∈ [d] we have,
(a) 1− TB ci(X∗) ≥ 0,
(b) λ∗i > 0 =⇒ 1− TB ci(X∗) = 0.
Proof. Part (a). For contradiction, consider resource i that minimizes the left-hand side in (a), and assume
that the said left-hand side is strictly negative. We have two cases: either λ∗i < 1 or λ
∗
i = 1. When λ
∗
i < 1,
consider another distribution λ˜ ∈ ∆d such that λ˜i = 1 and λ˜i′ = 0 for every i′ 6= i. Note that we have,
L(X∗, λ˜) < L(X∗,λ∗). This contradicts the first inequality in (A.1).
Consider the second case, when λ∗i = 1. Then L(X∗,λ∗) = r(X∗) + 1 − TB ci(X∗). Consider
any arm a ∈ [K] such that X∗(a) 6= 0. Let X˜ ∈ ∆K be another distribution such that X˜(a) := 0 and
X˜(null) := X∗(null)+X∗(a) and X˜(a′) = X∗(a′) for every a′ 6∈ {a,null}. Note that X˜(null) ≤ 1. Since
(X∗,λ∗) is a Nash equilibrium, we have that L(X˜,λ∗) ≤ L(X∗,λ∗). This implies that −X∗(a)r(a) +
X∗(a) TB ci(a) ≤ 0. Re-arranging we obtain, TB ci(a) ≤ r(a) ≤ 1. Thus, we have 1− TB ci(a) ≥ 0.
Since this holds for every a ∈ [K] with X∗(a) 6= 0, we obtain a contradiction:
1− TB ci(X∗) =
∑
a∈[K]X
∗(a)
(
1− TB ci(a)
) ≥ 0.
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Part (b). For contradiction, assume the statement is false for some resource i. Then, by part (a), λ∗i > 0
and 1 − TB ci(X∗) > 0, and consequently L(X∗,λ∗) > r(X∗). Now, consider distribution λ˜ which puts
probability 1 on the dummy resource. We then have L(X∗, λ˜) = r(X∗) < L(X∗,λ∗), contradicting the
first inequality in Eq. (A.1).
Let X˜ be some feasible solution for the linear program (4.1). Plugging the feasibility constraints into
the definition of the Lagrangian function, L(X˜,λ∗) ≥ r(X˜). Claim A.4(a) implies that X∗ is a feasible
solution to the linear program (4.1). Claim A.4(b) implies that L(X∗,λ∗) = r(X∗). Thus,
r(X∗) = L(X∗,λ∗) ≥ L(X˜,λ∗) ≥ r(X˜).
So,X∗ is an optimal solution to the LP. In particular, OPTLP = r(X∗) = L(X∗,λ∗).
A.3 The stopped LP for Adversarial BwK: proof of Eq. (5.4)
The proof is similar to prior work Badanidiyuru et al. (2018); Devanur et al. (2011). DenoteDτ to be the set
of all distributions over the arms such that for every p ∈ Dτ we have the following: for every i ∈ [d] we have∑
t∈[τ ] p · ct,i ≤ B. In other words, Dτ denotes the set of distributions whose expected stopping time is at
least τ . Thus it immediately follows that OPTLP(τ) ≥ maxp∈Dτ
∑
t∈[τ ] p · rt since for any given p ∈ Dτ it
is feasible to LP(τ). Thus OPTLP(τ) is at least the value of any feasible solution p ∈ Dτ . Note that for every
fixed distribution p ∈ ∆K , there exists a τ such that either p ∈ Dτ and p 6∈ Dτ+1 or p ∈ DT . Moreover the
total expected reward we can obtain using p is
∑
t∈[τ ] p · rt. Thus max1≤τ≤T OPTLP(τ) ≥ OPTFD.
A.4 Regret minimization in games: proof of Lemma 3.1
Let us revisit adversarial online learning, as per Figure 1. Denote the benchmark in Eq. (3.2) as
OPTAOL(T ) := maxa∈A
∑
t∈[T ] ft(a).
Recall that [bmin, bmax] is the payoff range, and denote σ = bmax − bmin.
Lemma A.5. Suppose an algorithm for adversarial online learning satisfies (3.2) for some δ > 0. Then
Pr
[
∀τ ∈ [T ] OPTAOL(τ) −
∑
t∈[τ ] f t · pt ≤ σ ·
(
Rδ/T (T ) +
√
2T log(T/δ)
) ]
≥ 1− 2δ. (A.2)
Proof. Let us use the stronger regret bound (3.3) implied by (3.2). Note that
E[ft(at) | a1, a2 , . . . , at−1] = f t · pt.
Applying the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality for each τ ∈ [T ], and taking a union bound, we have
Pr
[
∀τ ∈ [T ] ∑t∈[τ ] ft(at)−∑t∈[τ ] f t · pt ≤ σ ·√2T log(T/δ) ] ≥ 1− δ. (A.3)
Taking a union bound over Eq. (A.3) and Eq. (3.3) and adding the equations we get Eq. (A.2).
Remark A.6. For Hedge algorithm, regret bound Eq. (A.2) is already proved in Freund and Schapire (1997).
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Let W =
√
2T log(T/δ) denote the term from Lemma A.5 in what follows.
We now prove Lemma 3.1, similar to the proof in Freund and Schapire (1996) for the deterministic
game. Recall that we take averages up to some fixed round τ ∈ [T ]. We prove that the following two
inequalities hold, each with probability at least 1− δ.
1
τ
∑
t∈[τ ]
pTt,1Gt pt,2 ≥ v∗ − σ ·
R1, δ/T (T ) + 2W
τ
. (A.4)
1
τ
∑
t∈[τ ]
pTt,1Gt pt,2 ≤ pT1 Gp2 + σ ·
R2, δ/T (T ) + 2W
τ
∀p2 ∈ ∆A2 . (A.5)
Eq. (3.5) in Lemma 3.1 follows by adding Eq. (A.4) and Eq. (A.5).
First we prove Eq. (A.4). Following the set of inequalities in Section 2.5 of Freund and Schapire (1996)
we have,
1
τ
∑
t∈[τ ]
pTt,1Gtpt,2 ≥whp
1
τ
∑
t∈[τ ]
p∗1
TGt pt,2 − σ ·
R1, δ/T (T ) +W
τ
From Lemma A.5
≥whp 1
τ
∑
t∈[τ ]
p∗1
TGpt,2 − σ ·
R1, δ/T (T ) + 2W
τ
From Lemma A.1
= max
p1∈∆A1
1
τ
∑
t∈[τ ]
p1
TGpt,2 − σ ·
R1, δ/T (T ) + 2W
τ
From Definition of p∗1.
= max
p1∈∆A1
p1
TGp2 − σ ·
R1, δ/T (T ) + 2W
τ
From Definition of p2.
≥ min
p2∈∆A2
max
p1∈∆A1
pT1 Gp2 − σ ·
R1, δ/T (T ) + 2W
τ
Here ≤whp denotes statements that hold with probability at least 1− δ.
Now let us prove (A.5). Fix distribution p2 ∈ ∆A2 . Then:
1
τ
∑
t∈[τ ]
pTt,1Gt pt,2 ≤whp
1
τ
∑
t∈[τ ]
pt,1
TGt p2 + σ ·
R2, δ/T (T ) +W
τ
From Lemma A.5
≤whp 1
τ
∑
t∈[τ ]
pt,1
TGp2 + σ ·
R2, δ/T (T ) + 2W
τ
From Lemma A.1
= p1
TGp2 + σ ·
R2, δ/T (T ) + 2W
τ
From Definition of p1.
Taking a union bound over all the four high-probability inequalities, we get the lemma.
B Table of notation
For reference, let us summarize the important notation used across sections.
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Notation Usage
OPTFD Optimal value of the fixed distribution over arms in hindsight.
OPTDP Optimal dynamic policy in hindsight.
REW Total (random) reward obtained by the algorithm
M Outcome matrix; rewards and consumption for every arm; o used to represent a row.
M τ Average of outcome matrices after τ time-steps.
M
ips
τ Average of outcome matrices estimated using IPS estimates after τ time-steps.
G Payoff matrix in the Lagrangian game
Rj,δ(τ) Regret of ALGj with probability at least 1− δ after τ rounds
R0,δ(τ) or R0(τ) Confidence term in the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality.
Uj(T | T0) Regret of ALGj after T rounds given the parameter T0 (this affects scaling of regret).
L(.) Lagrange function
T0 Parameter used in the Lagrangian. T0 = T in Stochastic BwK and T0 = ĝ in Adversarial BwK.
B0 Scaled budget. B0 = Bratio in Adversarial BwK (high-probability). Otherwise B0 = B.
ĝ, gmax, gmin Guess, maximum and minimum range of this guess respectively in Adversarial BwK.
κ Multiplicative factor with which guess is increased.
OPT
[τ ]
LP Best objective of the τ stopped LPs (i.e., stopped at times 1, 2 , . . . , τ ).
LPMτ ,B,τ Linear program corresponding to the average outcome matrixM τ .
OPTLP(M τ , B, τ) Optimal value of LPMτ ,B,τ .
50
